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Private choice programs provide government resources to qualified families to enable 
them to enroll their children in private schools of their choosing. “Gold standard” experimental 
studies have found overall mixed impacts of voucher programs, one form of private school 
choice arrangements, on student academic achievement. Yet, these results face external validity 
challenges, as both states, schools, and students can choose to participate in private choice 
programs, generating selection issues.  
This dissertation focuses on the decision-making of states, schools, and students in 
participating in private school choice programs. The first study estimates the effect of state level 
social factors on private school choice program adoption and expansion. Results indicate that 
political factors dominate predictions of policy adoption, and once enacted the program 
expansions tend to be driven by educational needs within states rather than their political 
environment. Also, individual tax-credits/deduction policies show a different logit in terms of 
program adoption and expansion than other types of private school choice programs.  
The second paper examines private school participation patterns in voucher programs in 
DC, Indiana, and Louisiana for 2014-15 school year. Results reveal that higher tuition levels and 
larger cohort enrollments, conditions normally associated with high quality schools, help identify 
schools that are less likely to participate in voucher programs. Further, private schools in D.C. 
and Louisiana, the two states that have higher regulatory burdens, are less likely to participate in 
their voucher programs compared to private schools in less-regulated Indiana.  
The last paper focuses on student participation patterns in the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program (LSP). Specifically, we investigate if there is any systematic pattern regarding program 
attrition. Little evidence is found that more disadvantaged students, economically and 




lower baseline test scores, however, do tend to face a greater risk of leaving the LSP, as do 
students who were assigned private schools farther from home and schools that serve larger 
minority populations. Results indicate that in the LSP, students’ self-selections into and out of 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
Ever since the publication of A Nation at Risk, the unsatisfying public education results in the 
U.S. have become a major concern of parents, school leaders, and education policy makers. 
Several attempts have been made to remedy this situation and increasing funding has been a 
common approach. However, the flat performance on the NAEP test scores, lasting achievement 
gaps between students of different races, and the discouraging PISA international test scores in 
the last three decades reveal a regrettable truth: an increase in spending does not necessarily 
translate into higher student achievement, especially for students in most need (NCES, 2018; 
OECD Education, 2015; Hanushek, 2003).  
Private school choice programs have been enacted and expanded across the States since 
the 1990’s as another remedy for the unsatisfying condition of the public education system. Such 
programs provide resources to qualified families that allow them to attend a private educational 
institution of their choice (Wolf, 2008, p. 635). Private school choice arrangements have been 
considered a policy solution that aims to address education quality and equity concerns by 
introducing competitive pressures, funding individual students and not schools, and empowering 
families to control their child’s education (Friedman, 1955; Chubb & Moe, 1990). To date, 30 
states have enacted at least one form of private school choice arrangements including vouchers, 
tax-credits, individual tax-credit/deductions, and Educational Saving Accounts (ESAs) (Figure 
1.1), enrolling approximately 466,000 students nationwide in the year 2017-18 (EdChoice, 2018, 
p.7). 
With the rapid expansion in both the number of states embracing such policies and the 




arrangements have been heatedly debated in the education reform community. A major question 
that has been asked is: do private school choice programs improve student performance at all? 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Count of States with Private School Choice Programs 
SOURCES: Retrieved from http://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america. 
 
Lottery-based experimental design is the most appealing approach to estimate the true 
effect of a school choice program, and these rigorous studies predominantly have focused on 
voucher programs. The sixteen evaluations of U.S. voucher programs that have used “gold 
standard” experimental design show mixed results on student achievement at the aggregate 
“program” level. The Charlotte Children’s Scholarship program was found to have significant 
positive impacts on participating student’s reading (Cowen, 2008; Greene, 2000), and the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice program was found to have significant positive impacts on 




Louisiana Scholarship Program, one of the first statewide voucher programs, was found to have 
negatively influenced participants achievement in both math and reading at least for the first two 
years (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018; Mills & Wolf, 2017). Most of the other 
experimental voucher evaluations in DC, New York City, and Dayton, Ohio show positive yet 
insignificant impacts on overall student math and reading achievements (Howell et al., 2002; 
Wolf et al., 2013). A recent meta-analysis of these randomized controlled trial (RCT) studies 
finds that voucher programs tend to have significant positive effects for students who remain 
longer in the program (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016). Effects of private school choice 
programs on educational attainment tend to be larger and more consistent, as experimental 
evaluations of both the DC Opportunity Scholarship and New York City private-school 
scholarship program have found that the programs improve students’ high school graduation 
rates or college enrollment rates by a significant amount (Wolf et al., 2013; Chingos & Peterson, 
2015; Chingos & Kuehn, 2017). 
The results of evaluations of private school choice programs are not only inconclusive 
but also ungeneralizable nationwide as they all suffer from selection issues. At a broad level, 
states select into choice programs. So far, 30 states have adopted at least one type of private 
school choice arrangement, as Wisconsin has the longest voucher history1 and Maryland and 
South Dakota newly joined the private school choice club in 2016; Florida has adopted vouchers, 
tax-credit/deductions and Educational Saving Account arrangements, while Tennessee only 
enacted one Educational Saving Account program in 2015 (EdChoice, 2018). The political, 
                                                 
1
 Maine and Vermont have operated “town tuitioning” programs for almost 150 years. I count 
them as school voucher programs in my studies, because they fit the literal definition of a 
voucher program, but most people recognize Milwaukee as home to the original school voucher 




educational, and economic environment of each state at different times influences their policy 
adoption decision and program design, in terms of what type of private school choice 
arrangement to adopt, in what scope, and for which subgroups of the population, yet less 
attention has been addressed to this issue of selectivity in private school choice programs.  
Within states, schools choose, too. In the DC Opportunity Scholarship and Indiana’s 
Choice Scholarship Program, over 70% of private schools received voucher using students, while 
only one third of private schools in the Louisiana program did so (EdChoice, 2018). Since the 
private schools in a voucher program are, to a significant extent, the program itself, the lack of 
analyses of school participation into private school choice programs is a hole that cries to be 
filled. 
Within programs, students select too. In the New York City School Choice Scholarship 
Program, nearly 26% of students failed to use the vouchers to attend private schools within the 
area during the program’s first year (Howell, 2004) and this decline rate is similar in the 
Charlotte Children’s Scholarship Fund (Cowen, 2010) and DC Opportunity Scholarship Program 
(Wolf et al., 2006). Among students who use their voucher initially, nearly 20% to 35% of them 
exit from the program annually in later years (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 
2013; Howell, 2004). Students self-selecting into or out of choice programs makes participants 
unrepresentative of the overall eligible population of students thus challenging the external 
validity of program evaluations. 
This dissertation focuses on these selection issues. Specifically, I conduct three studies 
describing the participation patterns of states, schools, and students in private school choice 




The first study (Chapter 2) provides an exploratory analysis of the state-level factors that 
predict the adoption and expansion of private school choice policies in 49 states from 2000 
through 2015. Results indicate that political, need, and resource factors all appear to play some 
role in predicting private school choice policy adoption, though political factors, especially the 
Republican partisan control of the Legislature and Governorship, dominate our predictions. Once 
enacted, the expansion of private school choice programs tends to be driven more by lower 
graduation rates and lower NAEP performance rather than political support. Also, the logic of 
private school choice adoption is different in predictable ways for vouchers and tax-credit 
scholarships targeted to disadvantaged students compared to individual tax-credits/deductions 
that mainly benefit higher-income families and therefore are more welcomed in educationally 
better-off states.  
In the second paper (Chapter 3) which was published in the Journal of School Choice, my 
co-authors and I examine private school participation patterns in voucher programs in DC, 
Indiana, and Louisiana for school year 2014-15. We collect data on school quality and voucher 
participation status for over 660 private schools across three states, and employ a linear 
probability model to examine how school quality, as measured by tuition-level, enrollment and 
Great School Review scores, is associated with program participation decisions. Our results 
reveal higher tuition levels and larger cohort enrollments, conditions normally associated with 
high quality schools, help identify schools that are less likely to participate in voucher programs. 
We also find a consistent negative relationship between Great Schools Review scores and school 
participation decisions, indicating lower quality schools have a higher tendency of participating 
in voucher programs in all three states, however these estimated effects not found to be 




Louisiana, the two states that have higher regulatory burdens, are less likely to participate in 
voucher programs.  
Finally, the third paper (Chapter 4) focuses on student participation patterns in a voucher 
program and tests if the voucher program “cream skims” the best students into the program and 
“pushes out” the most difficult to teach students from the program in the context of the Louisiana 
Scholarship Program (LSP). Specifically, we investigate if there is any systematic pattern 
regarding the characteristics of students (1) who do not use a voucher offered to them to attend 
the private school of their choice, and to (2) do not remain in the choice school in which they 
initially enroll with the help of a voucher. The LSP shows relatively low voucher initial declining 
and subsequent attrition rates for the non-kindergarten students participating in the program. 
Little evidence is found that more disadvantaged students, economically and academically, are 
“cream skimmed” into voucher use or “pushed out” after initially attended private schools using 
vouchers at a higher rate after initially attending a private school, with the sole exception of 
students with special educational needs whom small private schools may be ill-equipped to 
serve. However, students with lower baseline test scores tend to face a greater risk of leaving the 
LSP, as do students who were assigned private schools farther from home and that serve a larger 
minority population. Results indicate that, in the LSP, students’ self-selections are driven more 
by the program setting rather than by their personal demographics. 
Taken together, these three studies provide empirical evidence on participation patterns 
of states, schools, and students in private choice programs in the U.S. This dissertation benefits 
the literatures on private school choice programs by contributing to an improved understanding 
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Chapter 2 2 
Going Private: Political Factors Shaping the Enactment & Expansion of Private School 
Choice in the U.S. 
 
Introduction 
Just as European explorers long searched for the source of the Mississippi River, eventually 
identifying it as Lake Itasca, political scientists have long wondered about the origination and 
spread of public policies. Variously called “policy adoption,” “policy innovation,” or “policy 
diffusion,” the question in all cases is why do representative governments enact certain policies 
at specific times for particular places? 
 The question of what factors influence policy adoption is particularly intriguing in the 
case of private school choice programs. Such programs “provide government resources to 
parents to enable them to enroll their children in independent private schools of their choosing.” 
(Wolf, 2008, p. 635). Private school choice arrangements provide either direct payments, through 
vouchers, or indirect subsidies, through tax-credit scholarships or personal tax credits or 
deductions. By 2018, a total of 63 private school choice arrangements were operating or newly 
enacted in 30 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia (Ed Choice, 2018). Why have some states 
adopted this politically controversial education reform while others have demurred? That is the 
central question of this exploratory empirical study. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the private school choice 
programs in the U.S. We then discuss the theory and prior research regarding policy adoption 
with special emphasis on education reforms and school choice. A brief section after that states 
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our formal research questions, proceeds with a discussion of our data and analytic methodology. 
Then we present our results. The concluding section discusses the results of our analysis and 
contributions.  
Private School Choice in the U.S. 
A clear description of “private school choice arrangement” is a key prerequisite of efforts 
to discuss the policy issue. In our study, the categories of private school choice arrangements are 
obtained from the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice’s annual publication, The ABCs 
of School Choice. The private school choice arrangements include vouchers, Education Saving 
Accounts, tax-credit scholarships, and individual tax-credits/deductions. 
Broadly speaking, all four private school choice arrangements are designed to increase 
families’ eligibility and affordability for alternative schoolings: voucher programs allow targeted 
students who are disadvantaged in some respect to use public funding to pay partial or full tuition 
for their child’s private schooling, while the Education Savings Accounts (ESA) allow parents to 
withdraw a portion of the funds from the account in which the state otherwise would spend on a 
child’s education is placed to direct to the education providers of their choosing (Butcher & 
Burke, 2016); tax-credit scholarships allow taxpayers to claim a dollar-for-dollar credit when 
they donate to nonprofit institutions that provide either private school scholarships or public 
school improving funding; similarly, individual tax-credits/deductions allow parents to receive 
state income tax relief for their approved educational expenses, such as private school tuition, 
books, tutors, and other education expenses for their children.  
Though all these four types of private school choice arrangements aim at enhancing 
families’ choice and market forces, the program design of each arrangement are quite different. 




sources. Vouchers and ESAs involve reallocation of government educational resources, while 
tax-credit scholarships and individual tax-credits/deductions are tax benefits of individual 
families. Second, the voucher funding can only be used to subsidize private school tuition costs, 
while funding or tax benefits of ESAs, tax-credit scholarships, and individual tax-
credits/deductions can be used for a broader range of educational expenses besides private school 
tuition, such as private tutoring fees and text books, thus providing more secular options than 
vouchers. As a result, the ESAs, tax-credit scholarships, and individual tax-credits/deductions 
face less regulatory burdens than vouchers, as well as facing less constitutionals arguments. In 
the meantime, the four types of private school choice arrangements intend to benefit different 
populations with vouchers, as ESAs and tax-credit scholarships targeted at middle-and-lower 
income families, while the individual tax-credits/deductions are intended to benefit higher-
income families. Due to these major differences, the four private school choice arrangements 
face different political controversies and perform differently in terms of policy adoption and 
expansion. 
By the end of 2017, 30 states had at least one private school choice arrangement3 (Table 
2.1). Vouchers and tax-credit scholarships were the most common types of private school choice 
policy, as 17 states had at least one tax-credit scholarship policy and 15 states offered at least one 
voucher program by the end of 2017. Only six states had pioneered the new idea of Education 
Savings Accounts ever since it was introduced in 2012, and eight states offered individual tax-
credits/deductions. In the meantime, the individual tax-credits/deductions has the largest student 
participation, followed by the tax-credit scholarships and voucher programs. As a newly enacted 
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 We exclude Washington DC from our counts and analytic sample from here on because it is not 




private school choice program, the ESAs had only less than 8,000 participations by the end of 
2016.  
These four arrangements are not mutually exclusive, and in fact, many states have enacted 
at least two types of private school choice policies. But there is still much variation across states 
in terms of the timing of policy adoption and the size of student participation, in regard to these 
four arrangements. Our study, thus, focuses on recognizing what social factors may account for 
this variation. 
Theory and Prior Research 
We are interested in explaining a pattern of education policy adoption in the U.S. A 
policy is “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of 
given conditions to guide and determine present and future actions” (Merriam-Webster, 1983). It 
is precisely this selection of private school choice from among alternatives “in light of given 
conditions” that motivates our study. 
Policy adoption occurs in the middle of Lasswell’s (1936) five-step “policy cycle,” after 
agenda setting and policy formation and before implementation and evaluation. It is also called 
“policy diffusion” in modern parlance, particularly when discussing decision making at the state 
and local level in the U.S.4 Scholars quite naturally ask, “From where do policies come?” As 
Nelson Polsby (1984, p. 5) aptly puts it: 
                                                 
4
 Technically, policy adoption is distinct from policy diffusion when a state or locality adopts a 
policy that is unique, such as when Wisconsin launched an urban, means-tested school voucher 
program in 1990. Once one political jurisdiction has adopted a brand new policy, “policy 
adoption” and “policy diffusion” become identical terms everywhere else, which is why we use 










































1990  4 N/A  3 N/A  0 0  0 0  1 N/A 
…  …   …   …   …   …  
1999   8 385,901 a, b  5 9,759 a, b  0 0  1 3207  2 372,935 
2000  9 579,610 a, b  5 11,413 a, b  0 0  1 15,081  3 553,116 
2001  10 632,281 a, b  5 14,386 a, b  0 0  3 18,049  3 599,846 
2002   10 689,175 a  5 23,855 a  0 0  3 36,932  3 628,388 
2003   10 731,388 a  5 29,833 a  0 0  3 55,927  3 645,628 
2004  10 766,160 a  5 37,475 a  0 0  3 58,571  3 670,114 
2005  11 795,008 a  6 41,450 a  0 0  3 59,779  3 693,779 
2006  12 769,340 a  6 42,390 a  0 0  5 68,377  3 658,573 
2007  13 819,650 a  7 49,327 a  0 0  5 83,853  3 686,470 
2008  14 888,385 a  8 57,733 a  0 0  6 104,976  4 725,676 
2009  15 995,753 a  8 62,958 a  0 0  7 112,251  4 820,544 
2010   16 1,025,211  9 71,956  0 0  7 108,840  4 844,415 
2011  17 1,071,561  11 77,346  1 0  8 127,615  5 866,600 
2012  20 1,105,291  12 92,375  1 153  11 142,288  5 870,628 
2013  23 1,030,191  13 104,076  1 302  13 157,698  7 768,417 
2014  24 1,103,894  13 125,242  2 761  14 202,137  7 776,515 
2015  28 1,164,253  14 146,423  5 2,989  16 223,582  8 794,248 
2016  30 N/A  15 161,087  5 7,625  17 N/A  8 N/A 
2017  30 N/A  15 N/A  6 N/A  17 N/A  8 N/A 
SOURCE: “School Choice in America,” EdChoice, last modified January 16, 2018. Retrieved from EdChoice website: 
http://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america. 
Notes: 
a: Student participation of Town Tuitioning Program (Maine) of current year is not available thus is excluded from the calculation. 
b: Student participation of Town Tuitioning Program (Vermont) of current year is not available thus is excluded from the calculation. 




Yet no sophisticated student of contemporary American policy-making 
believes that policies normally spring fully formed from the overtaxed 
brow of the President or even from his immediate entourage. 
Policies are not born but made. 
Theories of Policy Adoption & Diffusion in the U.S. 
Why are certain policies made, or adopted, in a representative democracy such as the 
U.S.? John Kingdon (1984) argues that policy adoption requires the intersection of three streams 
of politics, policy, and problem. A social problem must present itself. A specific policy cure 
must be at hand. Finally, the political circumstances must be favorable for the adoption of the 
specific policy to address the particular problem.  
Nelson Polsby (1984), writing on Political Innovation in America, agrees substantially 
with much of Kingdon’s theory but emphasizes the interaction between problem (a.k.a. need) 
and politics. Polsby views Kingdon’s policy stream as a separate process that produces the policy 
ideas that are later harvested by political actors reacting to perceived needs. 
Trinitarian explanations of policy adoption remain all the rage in American politics. Choi, 
Turner and Volden (2002) claim that policy diffusion in our federal system of government is the 
product of “Means, Motive, and Opportunity.” By “means”, the authors are referring to fiscal 
resources. By “motive” they mean social need. By “opportunity”, they mean favorable political 
conditions. 
There is a stunning consensus in the theoretical literature regarding policy adoption in the 
U.S. that policies are embraced when the three forces of politics, need, and resources intersect, as 






Figure 2.1 Three Factors Contributing to Policy Adoption 
 
Previous Research on Policy Adoption Specifically Involving Education 
At the local level, K12 education is a developmental policy (Peterson, 1981). Because the 
community in general benefits in myriad ways when its members are effectively educated, local 
policymakers have incentives to optimize their approach to education. The policymaking process 
surrounding education is likely to be consensual. 
Much K12 educational policymaking, however, is made at the state level in the U.S. One 
step removed from localities, state-level education policymaking can have elements of 
redistribution in it, as differential funding and varied approaches based on need influence the 
parameters of public policy. With resource redistribution comes political conflict. As Paul 
Manna and his colleagues have observed, state-level adoption of education reforms are 
influenced by the availability of resources and organizational capacity (Manna & Ryan, 2011). 
The politics surrounding state-level education reforms is often conflictual and partisan, with 
Republicans supporting reforms that decentralize authority and Democrats supporting policies 




James Q. Wilson (1989, pp. 75-79) agrees with Peterson that most policymaking in the 
education realm is non-conflictual, focusing on political interests instead of political ideology. 
Wilson classifies public policies and the agencies charged with implementing them based on the 
concentration and diffusion of costs and benefits. Interest Group politics is the most fierce, 
according to Wilson, because concentrated benefits motivate at least one organized interest 
group to support the measure while concentrated costs motivate at least one other interest group 
to oppose it. Client Politics also involves policies with concentrated benefits but the politics 
surrounding it are benign because the costs of the policy are dispersed. When costs are 
concentrated but benefits dispersed, Entrepreneurial Politics is required, as the power of ideas is 
required to trump the political interests of policymakers. Finally, policies for which both the 
costs and benefits are dispersed generate Majoritarian Politics which is both relatively benign 
and somewhat unpredictable.  
If we accept Wilson’s policy typology, when a single organized interest group dominates 
the policy space, Client Politics, typified by consensus and agency capture, will be the norm. 
According to Terry Moe (2011b, p. 6), “The teachers’ unions have more influence on the public 
schools than any other group in American society.” Since a single organized interest, the 
teacher’s union, dominates K12 education policymaking, Client Politics surrounds it. Policies 
enthusiastically supported by the unions, such as more spending on education, teacher 
certification, professional development, and smaller class-sizes, will be easily adopted while 
policies opposed by the unions, such as teacher merit pay based on student test-score gains and 






The Special Case of Private School Choice 
Since education policy involves the relatively benign realm of Client Politics, and the 
teachers’ unions that dominate that field are staunchly opposed to private school choice, we 
might wonder why instruments of private school choice such as government-run school voucher 
programs and tax-credit-funded K12 scholarship exist at all in the U.S. More to the point, why 
have such programs diffused widely across the country during the first 15 years of the new 
millennium? Has the political power of the teachers’ unions weakened or is school choice policy 
a special type of education policy with its own brand of politics? 
Shuls and Wolf (2015) argue that private school choice policies create strange political 
bedfellows. Politicians face a “school choice dilemma,” similar to the notorious “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma,” whereby they face incentives to defect by ensuring school choice for their particular 
constituents while denying it to others. As a result, the ideological wings of both the Democrat 
and Republican parties have joined forces in support of private school choice arrangements while 
the establishment wings of those parties, whose constituents are comfortable in their access to 
school choice, oppose them. 
Another way to think of the Shuls and Wolf claim, in Wilsonian terms, is that private 
school choice brings different politics to the two political parties. For Democrats, private school 
choice generates Interest Group Politics, not Client Politics. One key element of their political 
coalition (teachers’ unions) opposes choice while another important faction of the party (African 
Americans) supports it (Moe, 2001a). In the political vernacular, private school choice is a 
“wedge issue” in the Democratic Party, pitting different Democratic constituencies against each 




For Republicans, in contrast, private school choice brings with it Entrepreneurial Politics. 
The teachers’ unions influence the Grand Old Party (GOP) somewhat, though not as much as 
they sway the Democratic Party. Moreover, the benefits of private school choice tend to be 
realized by urban minorities who are not part of the GOP political coalition. Ideological 
commitments to market-based solutions to social problems is what motivates most Republicans 
to support private school choice. Ideological appeals to the common good are typical of 
Entrepreneurial Politics. 
In sum, theory and prior research suggest that politics, need, and resources all will play 
significant roles in the adoption of private school choice policies across space and time. They 
further indicate that political factors might play the greatest role, and that Republican control of 
state policymaking institutions, in particular, may prove to be crucial. In the remainder of this 
chapter we explore these possibilities.    
Research Questions 
In this chapter we examine which state-level factors, recommended to us by theory, 
predict policy decisions regarding the enactment and expansion of private school choice 
programs in the U.S. from 2000 through 2015. We begin our time-series analysis at the turn of 
the millennium for several reasons. First, only 9 states adopted private school choice policies in 
the 130 years between 1869 and 2000, suggesting that those pioneering choice states and their 
programs may have been largely the product of idiosyncratic and not systematic factors. In 
contrast, 20 new states adopted choice policies in the 15 years from 2000 to 2015, indicating that 
the period was a crucial decision time for states regarding whether or not to join the pantheon of 
private school choice adoptees. Second, reliable data regarding some of our key explanatory 




after 2015. Third, starting a time-series at the beginning of a new millennium is really cool. In 
sum, the research questions posed below should be understood as applying to the specific period 
of 2000-2015 in the U.S.   
We test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Political, Need, and Resource related factors all will have some association 
with the adoption and expansion of private school choice programs overall 
and individually; 
Hypothesis 2: Political factors will have the most consistent and predictable association 
with adoption and expansion of private school choice programs overall 
and individually; 
Hypothesis 3: Resource factors will trump Need in the case of ITC-D, which primarily 
benefit higher-income families. 
 
Data and Sample Description 
Our general theoretical frame is dynamic policy decision-making in the U.S. context. We 
focus on individual U.S. states as the unit of analysis because education is a developmental 
policy with decision-making subsequently concentrated at the state and local level (Peterson, 
1981). We customize that framework for the specific case of private school choice by 
considering the influence of a variety of social factors in the decision to enact and expand such 
programs. These factors are categorized as political factors, need factors, and resources factors. 
All data are collected from public available datasets e.g. EdChoice and Common Core of Data 





The theoretical literature is clear that policy adoption in a state is likely to be influenced 
by political characteristics. In this chapter, we are interested in two dimensions of state-level 
politics: political identity and institutional support for school choice.  
Political parties tend to have clearly defined ideologies and support substantively 
different programmatic agendas (Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart, 2011). Hassel (1990) 
suggests that the Republican Party platform is more frequently linked to school choice options. 
Kenny (2005) states that Republican partisans and political conservatives in general tend to 
support private school choice because they believe that the competition brought about by choice 
improves the efficiency of the education system as a whole. Democrats and liberals, in contrast, 
tend to oppose vouchers because they have a stronger faith in the public sector and are aligned 
politically with teachers’ unions. Other studies, however, find that having a Republican 
Governor does not predict a higher likelihood of consideration or adoption of school choice laws 
(Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Witte, Shober & Manna, 2003; Wong & Shen, 2002; Wong & 
Langevin, 2007).  
In our study, we use binary variables indicating whether or not Republicans have 
majority control of the Legislature (Column 1), whether or not a state’s governor is Republican 
(Column 2), and whether or not Republicans have majority control of both the Legislature and 
Governorship (State Control, Column 3), see Table 2.2. Mathematically, the variable 
Republican-controlled Government is an interaction of Republican Governor and Republican-
controlled Legislature, that is the value of Republican-controlled Government equals to 1 only 
when both the Republican Governor and the Republican-controlled Legislature takes value 1. 




analyses both with and without the Republican-controlled Government included, since the 
interpretation of Republican-controlled Legislature and Republican Governor would be different 
when having an interaction term in the model: if there were no interaction term Republican-
controlled Government, the coefficient of Republican Governor and Republican-controlled 
Legislature should be interpreted as the unique effect of Republican partisan control of the 
Legislature and Governorship on program adoption/expansion, while with including the 
interaction Republican-controlled Government, the coefficient of Republican Governor and 
Republican-controlled Legislature should be interpreted as the unique effect of Republican 
partisan control of the Legislature and Governorship on the program adoption/ expansion when 
having a divided government, that is when either the Republican Governor or Republican-
controlled Legislature takes value 0. 
The annual state partisan control information is obtained from the National Conference of 
State Legislatures website (Table 2.2). 
 
Another political factor we include in our study is the strength of teachers’ unions. 
Studies have found that interest groups, especially teachers’ unions, play important roles in 
influencing policy outcomes. Moe (2011) argues teachers’ unions have more influence on the 
public schools than any other group in American society, since they can obstruct unwanted 
educational reform through collective bargaining. Fabella (2017) also found that the expenditures 
of teachers’ unions, which is a proxy for the teacher union strength of the state, is significantly 
negatively correlated with the number of school reform bills passed at the state level in the U.S. 
In this study, we use the Rank of Teacher Union Strength developed by Winkler, Scull, and 





Count of States with Republican Control (N=49) 
Year 






2000 18 29 15 
2001 18 28 13 
2002 17 26 11 
2003 20 25 12 
2004 21 27 12 
2005 19 27 12 
2006 20 28 12 
2007 15 21 10 
2008 14 21 10 
2009 14 21 9  
2010 14 23 9  
2011 25 28 20 
2012 27 28 22 
2013 24 29 23 
2014 27 28 23 
2015 30 30 23 
SOURCE: Retrieved from the National Conference of State Legislature (NCSL) website: 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx#Timelines, year 
2000 through 2017.  
Notes: Nebraska is excluded from the analysis due to its nonpartisan Legislature nature. 
 
The Teacher Union Strength measure that developed by Winkler, Scull, and 
Zeehandelaar (2012) denotes state ranks of combination of teacher union power scores in the 
following five dimensions: Resources and Membership, Involvement in Politics, Scope of 
Bargaining, State Policies, and Perceived Influence (Page 27). A state with a smaller value in the 
Teacher Union Strength, which indicates a higher rank, has teachers’ unions that are “stronger” 
in this state as compared to states with a higher value in this measure. In the report, Hawaii, 
Oregon and Montana are ranked as the three top states in the Teacher Union Strength thus are 
considered to have the “strongest” teachers’ unions, while Arizona, Florida and South Carolina 
are ranked as the last three states thus are considered to have the “weakest” teachers’ unions. 
Though the raw score of teacher union strength in each state are dynamic and vary from time to 
time, the relative ranks between states tend to be stable. Thus, we use Teacher Union Strength as 




regarding expending private school choice arrangements. We expect this variable is positively 
associated with the enactment and expansion of one or more private school choice arrangements: 
a state with a larger value in the Teacher Union Strength (weaker union strength) to be predicted 
to have a higher probability of enacting and expending a private school choice arrangement. 
The last political factor is institutional commitment to school choice. We expect that the 
greater presence of alternatives to the present system of public education in a state, the more 
comfortable the public will be with the enactment and expansion of one or more private school 
choice programs. Two variables proxy for this institutional support for private school choice: the 
percentage of students enrolled in charter schools and the percentage of students enrolled in 
public schools in the state during each school year. Enrollment information was collected from 
the Digest of Education Statistics released from the year 2000 to 2016. According to descriptive 
statistics (Table 2.3), an average of 1.9% of students were enrolled in charter schools across our 
sample and 10.1% of students attended private schools. 
Need Factors   
Private school choice is widely viewed as a controversial education reform. Inertia 
largely characterizes policymaking in the U.S., especially due to its constitutional system of 
separate powers and checks and balances. It often requires a clear public perception of a serious 
crisis in order to spur significant policy change even at the state level (Polsby 1984). Therefore, 
we expect that measures of extreme educational need at the state level will be predictors of 
private school choice enactments and expansions. The four educational need factors we include 
in our analysis are: (1) state National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) achievement 
level in 8th grade math, (2) high school graduation rate, (3) proportion of students that are 




the Digest of Education Statistics annual reports, and the state’s Poverty Rate was obtained from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement from 
U.S. Census Bureau in the corresponding year. 
NAEP math achievement level and high school graduation rates measure the quality of a 
state’s K12 education system and provide information to education policymakers on the 
comparative effectiveness of schools within and across states. We hypothesize that the lower the 
NAEP5 achievement level is (smaller portion of students achieving at or above the Basic level) 
and lower high school graduation rate, the greater the likelihood of the state enacting or 
continuing a private school choice program. Between 2000 and 2015, 70.3% of 8th grade students 
achieved at or above the Basic level on the NAEP math test; the average high school graduation 
rate6 was 77.2% across states during 2000-2015. 
The proportion of minority students indicates the racial composition of the school-age 
population of the state, and the poverty rate reveals economic need which often manifests itself 
in educational need. We hypothesize that higher proportions of minority students, and higher 
poverty rates both will predict a greater likelihood of states embracing private school choice. 
Summary statistics show that minority students account for 35.2% of the public-school 
population on average across our sample. The average poverty rate is 12.7% across states and 
time 2000-2015. 
                                                 
5
 Since the NAEP test is operated at odd years, we assume that the state test scores of the even 
year is equivalent to the score from the previous year. 
6
 We use the Average Freshmen Graduation Rate (AFGR) as indicator of the average high school 
graduation rate of the state before the 2013-14 school year and use the Public High School 4-year 
Adjusted Cohort Graduation Rate (ACGR) as indicator of the average high school graduation for 





Private school choice policies might be viewed by decision-makers as luxury goods. 
Since most private school choice policies are designed in ways that cost the state revenue, at 
least in the short run, the adoption and expansion of such policies is likely to be constrained by 
state economic conditions. We use (1) per-pupil expenditure and (2) population density as 
indicators of the availability of resources for private school choice policies. Controlling for the 
influence of educational need and political factors, we expect the economic characteristics to 
positively predict private school choice commitments. The yearly Per-pupil Expenditures is 
obtained from the NCES, and the population density of each state were obtained from the 2000 
Census. The summary statistics present an average per-pupil expenditure of $10,961 in real 2015 
dollars across the states from 2000 to 2015 (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 
Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables and their Expected Signs  




Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Political Factors            
Share of Charter School Enrollment (%) a  + 1.901 2.633 0 34.112 784 
Share of Private School Enrollment (%) a + 10.124 3.853 2.599 21.913 784 
Need Factors       
NAEP At or Above the Basic Level (%) b - 70.337 8.553 42 86 751 
High School Graduation Rate (%) a - 77.197 7.708 54.2 93 784 
Proportion of Minority Students (%) a + 35.161 18.234 3.158 86.674 781 
Poverty Rate (%) c + 12.684 3.370 4.5 23.1 784 
Resource Factors       
Population Density (per square kilometer) d + 185.153 249.251 1.1 1134.4 784 
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand) a + 10.961 2.802 6.042 20.744 784 
Notes:  
a: SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary School 
Universe Survey," 2000-01 through 2015-16; 
b: SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 2000, 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 Mathematics Assessments;  
c: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) 
Supplement, 2000 through 2015. 




We estimate the model over the entire time-series of 2000-2015 to test our major 
hypotheses regarding the adoption of voucher, tax-credit scholarship, and individual tax-
credits/deductions policies. As we collect data on 49 states across 16 years, our sample contains 
784 state-year observations, though missing data on some variables limit the sample to 751-784 
observations for our overall model estimations. 
Analytic Strategy  
This section presents the analytic strategies for examining which state-level factors, 
recommended to us by theory, predict policy decisions regarding the enactment and expansion of 
private school choice programs in the U.S. from 2000 through 2015.  
Policy Adoption 
Since policy decisions were made across time, the decision making of whether to support 
a private school choice policy is a dynamic process best captured by a longitudinal decision-
making model. Additionally, once a state enacts a private school choice program, the state will 
not be exposed to the risk of readopting this program in later years. Thus, it was determined that 
survival models, so called event history analysis, are especially appropriate to estimate what kind 
of and to what extent the various social factors influence an individual state’s decisions regarding 
enacting and continuing private school choice policies from the year 2000 to 2015.  
The Survival Analysis is considered as a standard statistical approach for state policy 
innovation studies. Berry and Berry (1990) first introduced this model for studying policy 
innovation then became widely accepted as the most effective tool to estimate the causes of 
policy innovation among states, including school choice policies (Mintrom, 1997; Wong & 




estimate the effect of social factors on individual state adopting private school choice 
arrangements, using the calendar year as our unit of time.  
We assume the state is exposed to the risk of adopting private school choice 
arrangements in a rate of: 
h(𝑡𝑖𝑗) = Pr(T𝑖 = j|T𝑖 ≥ j)     (1) 
where h(t) is the hazard ratio that for individual state i the event (adopting a private school 
choice policy) occurs at time j under the condition that individual states were still exposed to the 
risk just before j. Once the state enacted a private school choice policy in the year j, the state will 
no longer be considered at risk.  
Mathematically, the estimated hazard function of adopting a private school choice 




      (2) 
Where 𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗 refers to the number of states enacted a private school choice 
arrangement in year j and 𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗  represent the number of states did not have any private 
school choice arrangement at the beginning of year j (Singer & Willett, 2003, p.332). Thus, in 
the Life Table of enacting a private school choice policy (Table 2.4), we present the risk set as 
the number of states who had never enacted the targeted policy by the beginning of year j in 
Column 1, and present the number of states who enacted the targeted policy in year j in Column 
2. Finally we estimate hazard functions ℎ̂(𝑡𝑗) of each target policy from year 2000 to 2015 to be 
the rates in Column 5. Hazard ratios of enacting any private school choice policy and hazard 
ratios of adopting vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, and individual tax-credits/deductions are 




Since the ESAs hadn’t started until 2012 and was unique across the states at the time 
(five more ESAs have been enacted since), we exclude this policy from our analysis due to low 
analytical power. The exclusion of the ESAs does not affect our classification of states enacted 
any type of private school choice arrangement, however, since all the states have operated at 
least one of the other forms of private school choice arrangements. 
To further estimate the effect of social factors on the hazard ratios of private school 
choice policy adoptions, we incorporate our analysis with the Cox Proportional Hazard model 
which includes multiple predictors, both continuous and categorical: 
h(𝑡𝑖𝑗) =h0(𝑡𝑗)exp (𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′ . 𝜷 + 𝑵𝒆𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′ . 𝜸 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′ . 𝝆) 
(3) 
Where the dependent variable is the hazard ratio of state i at time j enacting a private school 
choice policy, and it is the function of three vectors of risk factors: Political Factors, Need 
Factors, and Resource Factors. 
In all, the Cox Proportional Hazard Model in this case estimates the effect of the state’s 
characteristics on whether or not it has self-selected to enacting one or more private school 
choice programs. It is important to note that the hazard ratios 𝛽𝑖 are not interpreted in the same 
manner as coefficients in multiple regressions. Since the model is in an exponential form, a 
variable with a hazard ratio larger than 1 should be interpreted as having a higher probability of 
being hazard (enact the targeted policy), while a variable with a hazard ratio smaller than 1 








Life Table Describing the Number of Years in Having a Private School Choice Arrangement 
Year j 
Risk Set at 
year j a 
(1) 














Any Private School Choice Arrangement 
2000 49 9 9 0.184 0.184 
2001 40 1 10 0.204 0.025 
2002 39 0 10 0.204 0.000 
2003 39 0 10 0.204 0.000 
2004 39 0 10 0.204 0.000 
2005 39 1 11 0.224 0.026 
2006 38 1 12 0.245 0.026 
2007 37 1 13 0.265 0.027 
2008 36 1 14 0.286 0.028 
2009 35 1 15 0.306 0.029 
2010 34 1 16 0.327 0.029 
2011 33 1 17 0.347 0.030 
2012 32 3 20 0.408 0.094 
2013 29 3 23 0.469 0.103 
2014 26 1 24 0.490 0.038 
2015 25 4 28 0.571 0.160 
Vouchers 
2000 49 5 5 0.102 0.102 
2001 44 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2002 44 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2003 44 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2004 44 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2005 44 1 6 0.122 0.023 
2006 43 0 6 0.122 0.000 
2007 43 1 7 0.143 0.023 
2008 42 1 8 0.163 0.024 
2009 41 0 8 0.163 0.000 
2010 41 1 9 0.184 0.024 
2011 40 2 11 0.224 0.050 
2012 38 1 12 0.245 0.026 
2013 37 1 13 0.265 0.027 
2014 36 0 13 0.265 0.000 






Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Year j 
Risk Set at 
year j a 
(1) 















2000 49 1 1 0.020 0.020 
2001 48 2 3 0.061 0.042 
2002 48 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2003 48 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2004 48 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2005 48 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2006 46 2 5 0.102 0.043 
2007 46 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2008 44 1 6 0.122 0.023 
2009 43 1 7 0.143 0.023 
2010 43 0 7 0.143 0.000 
2011 42 1 8 0.163 0.024 
2012 41 3 11 0.224 0.073 
2013 38 2 13 0.265 0.053 
2014 36 1 14 0.286 0.028 
2015 35 2 16 0.327 0.057 
Individual Tax-credits/deductions 
2000 49 3 3 0.061 0.061 
2001 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2002 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2003 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2004 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2005 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2006 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2007 46 0 3 0.061 0.000 
2008 46 1 4 0.082 0.022 
2009 45 0 4 0.082 0.000 
2010 45 0 4 0.082 0.000 
2011 45 1 5 0.102 0.022 
2012 44 0 5 0.102 0.000 
2013 44 2 7 0.143 0.045 
2014 42 0 7 0.143 0.000 
SOURCE: “School Choice in America,” EdChoice, last modified January 16, 2018. Retrieved 
from EdChoice website: http://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america. 
Notes: a: The risk set presented here exclude the Nebraska and is there for calculated at a 







At the second part, we utilize panel data analyses with state and year fixed effects to 
estimate how various social factors further influence the magnitude of the private school choice 
programs within states from the year 2000 to 2015. At the state level, the magnitude of the 
arrangements is hypothesized to be influenced by a similar cluster of factors: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎0 + 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′. 𝜷 + 𝑵𝒆𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′. 𝜸 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑖𝑗
′. 𝝆 + 𝜃𝑖 +
𝛿𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗            (4) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the magnitude of a given state i’s private school choice arrangement in year j. It is 
measured as the ratio of choice program enrollment over the total public school enrollment. The 
Political Factors, Need Factors, and Resource Factors are the same as Equation 3. 𝜃 and 𝛿 
refers to state and year fixed effect, respectively, and  refers to the random error of state i in 
year j. 
 According to the descriptive statistics of the size of each private school choice 
arrangement (Table 2.5), averagely students in a size equivalent to 7.5% of public school 
enrollment participated in at least one type of private school choice arrangement, this ratio 
ranges from 1×10-4% to 41.6%. While fewer states have enacted the Individual tax-
credits/deductions, the average size of Individual tax-credits/deductions across states and time 
period is larger than vouchers and tax-credit scholarships.  
Table 2.5 
Summary Statistics of Size of Program Enrollment (%) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N State T-bar 
All Arrangements 7.555 11.636 0.000 41.619 24 8.708 
Vouchers 1.244 1.282 0.000 4.666 13 8.308 
Tax-credit Scholarships 1.286 1.171 0.002 5.728 14 6.429 
Individual Tax-credits/deductions 21.434 12.671 0.013 39.886 7 8.857 
SOURCE: Retrieved from the “School Choice in America,” EdChoice, last modified January 16, 
2018. Retrieved from EdChoice website: http://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-
in-america. 





We examine how state-level social factors, including political factors, educational need 
factors, and economic resources, influence policy decisions regarding the enactment and 
expansion of private school choice programs in the U.S. Table 2.6 through Table 2.9 present the 
estimated marginal effects of the state characteristics on the state’s status as an operator of one or 
more private school choice programs, and Table 2.10 presents the estimated effects of those 
same factors on the expansion of private school choice initiatives. Table 2.11 compares the signs 
and significance of the coefficients with our predictions for both program adoption/continuation 
and program expansion.  
Program Adoption 
We first estimate the effects of the state factors on the enactment or operation of any type 
of choice program, then limit the “1” category of our dependent variable to states that operate 
specific types of private school choice policies. In Table 2.6 through Table 2.9, we conduct a 
step by step analysis to incorporate Political Factors, Need Factors and Resources Factors 
individually and then simultaneously. This process also detects the multi-collinearity issues. 
Results in column 5 and 6 of Table 5 through Table 2.8 are of our main interest. Again, since the 
survival analysis model we use is in an exponential form, a variable with a hazard ratio larger 
than 1 should be interpreted as having a higher probability of enacting the targeted policy, while 
a variable with a hazard ratio smaller than 1, yet always positive, should be interpreted as having 





Adoption/continuation of any private school choice arrangement 
The results regarding the mere enactment or operation of one or more private school 
choice programs paint a clear picture, see Table 2.6. In Column 1 where we only include the 
time-varying variables of state’s partisan control on Legislature and Governorship, shares of 
enrollment in alternative schools and the time-invariant factor Teacher Union Strength. We find 
the Republican-controlled Legislature positively predicts the private school program adoption 
overall, with a hazard ratio higher than 1 (p<.10). After including the interaction Republican-
controlled Government, the Republican Governor also tend to positively predicts the private 
school choice policy adoption, marginally significant at p<.10, while the effect of Republican-
controlled Government is not significantly different form zero (Column 2). This indicates for 
states with divided government, having Republican control at either state Legislature or the 
Governorship is predicted to have a positive impact on promoting private school choice policies. 
Model 3 includes only educational need factors, while Model 4 includes only economic 
resource factors. None of the four educational need factors are significantly predictive of private 
school choice program enactment, while only the Per-pupil Expenditure, a measure of a state’s 
educational investment, is negatively predictive of private school choice program adoption 
(p<.05). This result is contrary to our hypothesis. 
In the joint model (Column 6), only the Republican-controlled Legislature and the Per-
pupil Expenditure significantly predict the state adoption of any private school choice policy 
when including the Republican-controlled Government, both are significant at p<.10. The 
Republican-controlled Legislature positively predicts the possibility of adopting any private 
school choice policy when the state Governor are Democratic or Independent. This result aligns 








Effects on Hazard Ratios (based on the Cox proportional hazards models with time-varying 
effect) of Adopting Any Private School Choice Program 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature 1.121* 1.216*   1.102 1.200* 
 (0.071) (0.131)   (0.084) (0.131) 
Republican Governor 1.074 1.205*   1.051 1.158 
 (0.060) (0.118)   (0.061) (0.122) 
Republican-controlled Government  0.874    0.875 
  (0.087)    (0.093) 
Rank of Teacher Union Strength 1.011 1.013   1.005 1.003 
 (0.014) (0.014)   (0.018) (0.016) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  0.996 0.993   0.991 0.991 
 (0.009) (0.008)   (0.011) (0.012) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  1.009 1.010   1.005 1.005 
 (0.008) (0.007)   (0.009) (0.010) 
Need Factors       
NAEP On or Above Basic Level (%)   0.997  0.998 0.998 
   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) 
High School Graduation Rate   1.000  1.000 0.999 
   (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Portion of Minority Students    1.000  1.001 1.001 
   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Poverty Rate    0.937  0.996 0.997 
   (0.056)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    0.827** 0.986 0.985* 
    (0.072) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population Density    0.999 1.001 1.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
       
Observations 570 542 570 542 542 542 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the state adopted a private school 
choice program at the certain year during 2000 to 2015 (n=49, n events=28). Coefficients 
indicate the hazard ratio of adopting a private school choice program at the base line year. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Except the Rank of Teacher 
Union Strength and the Population Density who are time-invariant variables, all other variables 






Adoption/continuation for specific types of private school choice arrangements 
The state social factors that predict the operation of any private school choice program 
tend to perform consistently in predicting state adoption of specific type of private school choice 
arrangement, with a few notable exceptions.  
None of the political factors, educational need factors, nor economic resource factors are 
significantly predictive of state adopting a voucher program (Table 2.7). 
Compared to the voucher adoption, the factors predicting tax-credit scholarships adoption 
appear to be clearer (Table 2.8). A state with Republican-controlled Legislature while having a 
divided government is predicted to have a higher likelihood of adopting a tax-credit scholarships 
arrangement, marginally significant at the .10 level. This finding aligns with our hypothesis. 
Other political factors, Teacher Union Strength and share of enrollment of alternative schooling, 
are not predictive for tax-credit scholarships adoption. None of the Need Factors nor the 
Resource factors are significantly predictive. 
Table 2.9 presents the effects of social factors on state adoption of individual tax-
credits/deductions. When focusing on Political Factors alone (Column 1), we find a state has a 
Republican Governor or has a Republican-controlled Legislative tends to face a higher risk of 
enacting an individual tax-credits/deductions when not including the interaction of Republican-
controlled Government. These effect fades out when including the interaction of Republican-
controlled Government, as well as when including other social factors. In joint models (Column 
5 and 6), only the Republican Governor is significantly predictive of state’s adoption of 
individual tax-credits/deductions in a positive direction when including the interaction of 
Republican-controlled Government, marginally significant at the .10 level. The share of Charter 




and 2 (p<.10), while turn to be null after controlling for Need Factors and Resource Factors. 
Meanwhile, the Share of Private School Enrollment is positively associated with the probability 
of adopting an individual tax-credits/deductions across all models of specifications, significant at 
the .05 level.  
As we hypothesized, the decision-making logic surrounding the individual tax-credits/ 
deductions is somehow different than that surrounding the adoption of other private school 
choice policies, as it favors the middle/high income families rather than the disadvantaged 
families. The larger than 1 hazard ratios of the Share of Private School Enrollment in Column 5 
and 6 in Table 2.9 reveal these “reimbursements” from the state for self-financing alternative 
schooling, as states with higher share of students attend private schools are predicted to have 
higher probability of adopting the Individual Tax-credit/deduction policy. Still, none of Need 







Effects on Hazard Ratios (Based on the Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Time-varying 
Effect) of Adopting a Voucher 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature 1.126 1.086   1.159 1.114 
 (0.096) (0.142)   (0.141) (0.179) 
Republican Governor 1.067 1.021   1.014 0.961 
 (0.095) (0.150)   (0.092) (0.156) 
Republican-controlled Government  1.066    1.079 
  (0.162)    (0.175) 
Rank of Teacher Union Strength 1.036 1.036   0.999 1.000 
 (0.023) (0.024)   (0.025) (0.025) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  1.000 1.000   0.997 0.997 
 (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.009) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  1.006 1.007   1.015 1.015 
 (0.014) (0.014)   (0.023) (0.023) 
Need Factors       
NAEP At or Above Basic Level (%)   0.996  1.002 1.002 
   (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) 
High School Graduation Rate   0.999  1.000 1.000 
   (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Portion of Minority Students    1.000  1.000 1.000 
   (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Poverty Rate    1.075  1.026 1.026 
   (0.093)  (0.019) (0.019) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    0.807 0.971 0.972 
    (0.130) (0.032) (0.032) 
Population Density    0.997 0.999 0.999 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
       
Observations 666 635 666 635 635 635 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the state adopted a voucher 
program at the certain year during 2000 to 2015 (n=49, n events=15). Coefficients indicate the 
hazard ratios of adopting a voucher program at the base line year. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the state level. All variables except the Rank of Teacher Union Strength 
and the Population Density are considered as time-varying variables, while the Rank of Teacher 






Effects on Hazard Ratios (Based on the Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Time-varying 
Effect) of Adopting a Tax-credit Scholarship  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature 1.101 1.253*   1.129 1.258* 
 (0.080) (0.154)   (0.113) (0.179) 
Republican Governor 1.062 1.218   1.058 1.183 
 (0.071) (0.148)   (0.073) (0.125) 
Republican-controlled Government  0.832    0.854 
  (0.110)    (0.108) 
Rank of Teacher Union Strength 1.024 1.023   1.032 1.027 
 (0.026) (0.023)   (0.034) (0.031) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  0.986 0.987   0.98 0.981 
 (0.012) (0.012)   (0.016) (0.017) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  1.009 1.008   1.003 1.002 
 (0.008) (0.007)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Need Factors       
NAEP At or Above Basic Level (%)   0.995  0.993 0.994 
   (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
High School Graduation Rate   1.004  1.004 1.004 
   (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Portion of Minority Students    1.000  1.002 1.002 
   (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Poverty Rate    0.981  0.981 0.983 
   (0.077)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    0.872 0.990 0.990 
    (0.084) (0.015) (0.016)        
Population Density    1.000 1.001 1.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 692 692 658 692 658 658 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the state adopted a voucher 
program at the certain year during 2000 to 2015 (n=49, n events=16). Coefficients indicate the 
hazard ratios of adopting a Tax Credit Scholarship program at the base line year. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. All variables except the Rank of Teacher Union 
Strength and the Population Density are considered as time-varying variables, while the Rank of 






Effects on Hazard Ratios (Based on the Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Time-varying 
Effect) of Adopting an Individual Tax-credits/deductions 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature 1.259*** 1.418   1.069 1.028 
 (0.077) (0.449)   (0.127) (0.139) 
Republican Governor 1.425*** 1.553   1.605* 1.590* 
 (0.140) (0.459)   (0.416) (0.443) 
Republican-controlled Government  0.884    1.043 
  (0.279)    (0.132) 
Rank of Teacher Union Strength 1.005 1.005   0.961 0.961 
 (0.026) (0.025)   (0.039) (0.039) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  0.969* 0.969*   0.98 0.98 
 (0.018) (0.018)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  1.050*** 1.049***  1.065** 1.065** 
 (0.019) (0.019)   (0.032) (0.033) 
Need Factors       
NAEP At or Above Basic Level (%)   0.993  0.998  0.998  
   (0.006)  (0.012) (0.012) 
High School Graduation Rate   0.997  0.990  0.990  
   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Portion of Minority Students    0.998  0.996  0.996  
   (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Poverty Rate    0.957  1.002  1.002  
   (0.125)  (0.022) (0.022) 
Resource Factors     
  
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    0.875 0.959  0.959  
    (0.074) (0.067) (0.067) 
Population Density    0.999 0.998  0.998  
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
       
Observations 724 724 690 724 690 690 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the state adopted a voucher 
program at the certain year during 2000 to 2015 (n=49, n events=8). Coefficients indicate the 
hazard ratios of adopting an Individual tax-credits/deductions at the base line year. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. All variables except the Rank of 
Teacher Union Strength and the Population Density, two variables that are time-invariant, are 






Table 2.10 presents the estimated results of the effect of state characteristics on the 
expansion of private school choice programs across states. The size of a program is measured as 
the ratio of program enrollments relative to the public-school enrollment in the current year. For 
predicting the expansion of the targeted private school choice arrangement, we also conduct 
analyses both with and without the Republican-controlled Government included. As different 
types of programs embrace different levels of financial support, comparisons within specific 
types of private school choice programs is of higher policy relevance than the overall results for 
all arrangements, we therefore estimate the expansion of private school choice programs overall, 
and then estimate the expansion of targeted program, the vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, and 
the individual tax-credits/deductions separately. Two time-invariant variables, the Strength of 
Teacher Union and Population Density, are omitted in our analyses when using state and year 
fixed effects analysis.  
Appendix Table 2.1 through Appendix Table 2.4 in the Appendix present the step-by-step 
estimations of expansion for each policy arrangement, and the Table 2.10 below presents the 









Effects of the Social Factors on the Expansion of Private School Choice Programs 
VARIABLE 
All Programs Voucher Tax-credit Scholarship  Individual Tax-
credits/deductions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Political Factors                 
Republican-controlled Legislature 0.533 0.290 0.093 -0.228 -0.212 -0.035 -1.835 -1.696 
 (0.814) (0.685) (0.319) (0.211) (0.120) (0.175) (1.489) (1.666) 
Republican Governor -0.312 -0.55 0.241 -0.082 0.119 0.303 -1.435 -1.254 



















Share of Charter School Enrollment  -0.019 -0.021 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.01 2.233** 2.240** 
 (0.058) (0.050) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.667) (0.670) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  -0.215 -0.146 -0.053 0.021 0.052 0.008 -0.348 -0.488 
 (0.844) (0.694) (0.158) (0.149) (0.072) (0.073) (0.463) (0.320) 
Need Factors 
        
NAEP at or Above Basic Level (%) 0.219* 0.213 0.008 0.014 -0.018 -0.006 0.473* 0.489* 
 (0.124) (0.142) (0.037) (0.032) (0.053) (0.058) (0.203) (0.235) 
High School Graduation Rate -0.054 -0.049 -0.049 -0.045 -0.018 -0.020 -0.093** -0.093* 
 (0.058) (0.070) (0.034) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.035) (0.040) 
Portion of Minority Students  -0.224 -0.207 0.012 0.036 -0.081 -0.117 -2.571*** -2.615*** 
 (0.524) (0.461) (0.107) (0.113) (0.094) (0.091) (0.555) (0.605) 
Poverty Rate  -0.133 -0.129 -0.021 -0.015 0.013 0.009 -0.668*** -0.645*** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.046) (0.036) (0.047) (0.047) (0.176) (0.167) 
Resource Factors         
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand) -0.472 -0.428 -0.310** -0.308** -0.439*** -0.471*** 0.457 0.301 
 (0.744) (0.595) (0.117) (0.119) (0.097) (0.106) (1.265) (1.346) 
Constant 7.766  6.137  6.559* 4.353  8.025*** 9.392*** 58.723*** 61.807*** 
 (29.301) (23.699) (3.017) (3.374) (2.625) (2.340) (15.731) (14.723) 
Observations 198 198 101 101 89 89 59 59 
R-squared 0.122 0.124 0.501 0.533 0.766 0.775 0.785 0.787 
Number of States 24 24 13 13 14 14 7 7 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the enrollment of targeted program relative to the public-school enrollment within state in 
year t. Two time-invariant variables the Teacher Union Strength and the Population Density are omitted from the estimation. Robust 




Overall, most of the state characteristics do not significantly predict private school choice 
program expansion in general (Column 1 and 2 in Table 2.10). Within states, the NAEP 
achievement is positively correlated with the private school choice program expansion condition 
on other Need Factors and Resource Factors, however, is not consistent across model 
specifications. For example, within states, the NAEP achievement is positively associated with 
the relative size of all private school choice programs when not including the Republican-
controlled Government (p<.10), however turn to be null after adding the Republican-controlled 
Government interaction.   
Comparing the effect of social factors on program expansion across all three forms of 
private school choice, we find that the expansion of different types of private school choice 
arrangements are driven by different social factors.  
Partisan composition only influences voucher expansions. Within states, the relative size 
of voucher programs (Column 3 and 4) is positively correlated with the Republican-controlled 
Government: a state switch from non-Republican-controlled Government to Republican-
controlled Government is predicted to experience an expansion of voucher program in a size 
equivalent to 0.6 % of students enrolled in public schools that year. The overall insignificant 
effect of partisan control may have resulted from lack of variation across time within states, that 
is, only a few states have experienced switching of Legislature and Governor partisan control. 
In the meantime, within states, the Per-pupil Educational Expenditures tend to negatively 
associate with voucher and tax-credits relative sizes, significant at p<.05, as a higher expenditure 
on K12 public education is associated with a smaller size of vouchers and tax-credit scholarships 
(p<.05), while none of the Political Factors nor the Need Factors are significantly predictive of 




indicates a lower risk of educational crises, this negative associations between per-pupil 
expenditure and vouchers and tax-credits relative sizes within states are understandable. 
 Based on theory, we expect that the logic of individual tax-credit/educations expansion 
will be different from that of the expansion of other types of private school choice programs as it 
benefits higher income families more. Results largely align with our hypothesis. Within states, 
the increase of Share of Charter School Enrollment is significantly positively associated with 
individual tax-credits/deductions expansion, as 1 percentage point increase in the Share of 
Charter School Enrollment predicts an expansion of individual tax-credits/deductions 
participation by a size equivalent to 2.2% of public school enrollment, significant at the .05 level, 
all else equal. The partisan control is not as predictive as in the Vouchers expansions. Further, 
different from the expansion of vouchers and tax-credit scholarships, Need Factors tend to have 
a significant impact on individual tax-credits/deductions expansion. For instance, within states, a 
higher proportion of students achieved at or above the basic level of NAEP 8th grade math test 
and a higher High School Graduation Rate predict a larger size of individual tax-
credits/deductions, both are marginally significant at the .10 level. Meanwhile, within states, the 
minority enrollment and the Poverty Rate, two factors indicating states’ economic need for 
supporting public education, tend to be negatively associated with individual tax-
credits/deductions expansions: within states, a smaller enrollment of minority students and a 
lower poverty rate predicts a larger size of individual tax-credits/deductions, both are significant 
at the .01 level. Increase of Per-pupil Expenditure does not appear to significantly influence 




Discussion and Conclusion 
We present here the results of an exploratory empirical analysis of state characteristics 
that predict higher or lower likelihoods of private school choice policy adoption as well as 
program expansion after enactment. Table 2.11 compares the signs and significance of the 
coefficients with our predictions for both program adoption/continuation and program expansion.  
 This study is observational in design. All we can identify is systematic associations 
between factors. We cannot necessarily confirm that the relationships are causal. We also are 
limited to 49 political jurisdictions over a 16-year period in which a substantial number of states 
switched from non-adopters to adopters of private school choice programs. Missing data reduced 
our sample slightly when including NAEP achievement when 11 states did not report their test 
score at 2000. Thus, we caution readers to treat our findings with caution. 
Our first hypothesis was that political, educational need, and economic resource factors 
all will influence choice policy adoption and expansion. This hypothesis is partially confirmed 
by our analysis. At least some measures of each of the three types of characteristics are 
statistically significant predictors of policy adoption in our model estimations. These three sets of 
factors appear to interact in dynamic ways in influencing the adoption of education policies such 
as private school choice initiatives.  
Our second hypothesis was that political factors would be the most consistent and 
predictable factors influencing the adoption and expansion of private school choice programs. 
That hypothesis of policy adoption is largely confirmed by our statistical analysis in policy 
adoption, as 4 of 24 results regarding six political factors are statistically significant findings in 
the forecasted direction in estimating private school choice adoption. Among the six political 




adoption across all our model estimations, while it is not as clear in private school choice policy 
expansion. In states with a divided government, Republican-controlled Legislature tends to be 
positively predictive of adoption of private school choice in general and of tax-credit 
scholarships specifically, and having a Republican Governor is also positively associated with 
the adoption of individual tax-credits/deductions. Partisan control is less predictive in private 
school choice expansion, as only switching to a Republican-controlled Government is 
significantly predictive of expansion of voucher programs within states. Few of the educational 
need factors nor economic resource factors are consistently predictive for policy adoption and 
expansion, especially after we exclude the prediction of adopting individual tax-
credits/deductions which is qualitatively different from other forms of private school choice. The 
Per-pupil Expenditure is only predictive for adoption of private school choice in general and for 
expansion of vouchers and tax-credit scholarships specifically, and these coefficients are in the 
direction that is opposite to our hypothesis, as the role it plays is more toward an educational 
need factor rather than educational resource factor. Overall, compared to Need Factors and 
Resource Factors, the Political Factors, especially the Republican controls, show more consistent 
and predictable associations with private school choice adoptions. However, the hypothesis that 
politics would strongly influence private school choice expansion was not confirmed in our 
study. 
The results lead us to our third and final hypothesis that individual tax-credits/deductions 
would display a different logic surrounding policy adoption and expansion than other private 
school choice policies. Individual tax-credits/deductions are more beneficial to higher-income 
families while vouchers and tax-credit scholarships are overwhelmingly targeted at 




analysis. Different from the adoption and expansion of vouchers and tax-credit scholarships 
where the share of enrollment in alternative school are not significantly predictive, the Share of 
Private School Enrollment is significantly positively predictive of individual tax-
credits/deductions adoption and the Share of Charter School Enrollment is significantly 
positively predictive of the size of individual tax-credits within states. Moreover, the factors 
predicting individual tax-credits/deductions expansion also show a different trend to the 
predictors of expansion of vouchers and tax-credit programs. Need Factors trump Political 
Factors and Resource Factors in the case of individual tax-credits/deductions expansion while 
not predictive in the expansion of vouchers and tax-credit scholarships, and three of the four 
Need Factors are in an opposite direction of our assumption for private school choice 
arrangement expansion. Less educational crises, indicated by a larger proportion of students 
achieved at or above the basil level in NAEP test, a lower proportion of minority students, and a 
lower poverty rate, are positively associated with the expansion of individual tax-
credits/deductions.  
We think that the ultimate takeaway of this exploratory analysis is that the answer to 
what factors lead states to adopt private school choice programs is, “it depends.” What it depends 






Summary of the Estimated Impacts 
 
Notes:    
- : coefficient is negative and significant at p<0.1 
  
+: coefficient is positive and significant at p <0.1   
BLANK: coefficient is not significantly different from 0 at p <0.1  
GREEN the sign aligns with the 
hypothesis 
















Republican-controlled Legislature + + +
Republican Governor + +
Republican-controlled Government + +
Rank of Union Strength +
Share of Charter School Enrollment + +
Share of Private School Enrollment + +
Need Factors
NAEP at or Above Basic Level (%) - + +
High School Graduation Rate - -
Portion of Minority Students + -
Poverty Rate + -
Resource Factors
Population Density -
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Appendix Table 2.1 
Effects of the Social Factors on the Expansion of All Types of Private School Choice Programs 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature -0.021 -0.554   0.533 0.290 
 (0.646) (1.126)   (0.814) (0.685) 
Republican Governor -0.240 -0.756   -0.312 -0.550 
 (0.483) (1.410)   (0.647) (1.547) 
Republican-controlled Government  1.327    0.609 
  (2.863)    (2.726) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  -0.013 -0.019   -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.056) (0.046)   (0.058) (0.050) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  -0.151 -0.045   -0.215 -0.146 
 (0.698) (0.571)   (0.844) (0.694) 
Need Factors       
NAEP On or Above Basic Level (%)   0.241  0.219* 0.213 
   (0.144)  (0.124) (0.142) 
High School Graduation Rate   -0.057  -0.054 -0.049 
   (0.057)  (0.058) (0.070) 
Portion of Minority Students    -0.109  -0.224 -0.207 
   (0.385)  (0.524) (0.461)        
Poverty Rate    -0.122  -0.133 -0.129 
   (0.133)  (0.135) (0.137) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    -0.282 -0.472 -0.428 
    (0.447) (0.744) (0.595) 
       
Constant 6.752 5.615 -4.508 8.676* 7.766 6.137 
 (8.196) (6.791) (7.386) (4.262) (29.301) (23.699)        
Observations 209 209 198 209 198 198 
R-squared 0.126 0.137 0.101 0.128 0.122 0.124 
Number of States 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the enrollment of all private school choice arrangements 
relative to the public-school enrollment within state in year t. Two time-invariant variables the 
Teacher Union Strength and the Population Density are omitted from the estimation. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models 





Appendix Table 2.2 
Effects of the Social Factors on the Expansion of Vouchers 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature 0.190 -0.236   0.093 -0.228 
 (0.216) (0.264)   (0.319) (0.211) 
Republican Governor 0.219 -0.087   0.241 -0.082 
 (0.144) (0.103)   (0.163) (0.180) 
Republican-controlled Government  0.702    0.608** 
  (0.394)    (0.268) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  0.004 0.002   0.007 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016)   (0.007) (0.008) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  0.080 0.141*   -0.053 0.021 
 (0.102) (0.072)   (0.158) (0.149) 
Need Factors       
NAEP On or Above Basic Level (%)   -0.010  0.008 0.014 
   (0.035)  (0.037) (0.032) 
High School Graduation Rate   -0.044**  -0.049 -0.045 
   (0.018)  (0.034) (0.031) 
Portion of Minority Students    0.132  0.012 0.036 
   (0.141)  (0.107) (0.113)        
Poverty Rate    -0.034  -0.021 -0.015 
   (0.042)  (0.046) (0.036) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    -0.327*** -0.310** -0.308** 
    (0.086) (0.117) (0.119) 
       
Constant -0.995 -1.567* 1.109 3.713*** 6.559* 4.353 
 (1.038) (0.812) (3.156) (0.942) (3.017) (3.374) 
Observations 108 108 101 108 101 101 
R-squared 0.446 0.488 0.370 0.517 0.501 0.533 
Number of States 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the enrollment of Voucher programs relative to the 
public-school enrollment within state in year t. Two time-invariant variables the Teacher Union 
Strength and the Population Density are omitted from the estimation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models shown here have year 





Appendix Table 2.3 
Effects of the Social Factors on the Expansion of Tax-credits 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature -0.249* -0.210   -0.212* -0.035 
 (0.118) (0.150)   (0.109) (0.175) 
Republican Governor 0.204 0.248   0.119 0.303 
 (0.159) (0.183)   (0.093) (0.173) 
Republican-controlled Government  -0.104    -0.463 
  (0.121)    (0.274) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  0.004 0.005   0.008 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.026)   (0.014) (0.016) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  0.039 0.027   0.052 0.008 
 (0.110) (0.118)   (0.072) (0.073) 
Need Factors       
NAEP On or Above Basic Level (%)   -0.000  -0.018 -0.006 
   (0.062)  (0.053) (0.058) 
High School Graduation Rate   -0.019  -0.018 -0.020 
   (0.018)  (0.019) (0.019) 
Portion of Minority Students    -0.098  -0.081 -0.117 
   (0.122)  (0.094) (0.091) 
Poverty Rate    0.009 0.013 0.009 
 
   (0.036) (0.047) (0.047) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    -0.321*** -0.439*** -0.471*** 
 
   (0.083) (0.097) (0.106) 
       
Constant -0.744 -0.571 3.901 2.708** 8.025*** 9.392*** 
 (1.343) (1.424) (4.450) (0.916) (2.625) (2.340)        
Observations 90 90 89 90 89 89 
R-squared 0.718 0.719 0.703 0.727 0.766 0.775 
Number of States 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the participants of Tax-credit scholarships relative to 
the public-school enrollment within state in year t. Two time-invariant variables the Teacher 
Union Strength and the Population Density are omitted from the estimation. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models shown here 






Appendix Table 2.4  
Effects of the Social Factors on the Expansion of Individual Tax-credits/deductions 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Factors       
Republican-controlled Legislature -3.123 -3.125   -1.835 -1.696 
 (2.941) (2.977)   (1.489) (1.666) 
Republican Governor -1.666 -1.669   -1.435 -1.254 
 (2.197) (2.532)   (0.976) (1.272) 
Republican-controlled Government  0.041    -1.481 
  (3.776)    (2.913) 
Share of Charter School Enrollment  1.499 1.498   2.233** 2.240** 
 (1.199) (1.236)   (0.667) (0.670) 
Share of Private School Enrollment  -1.090 -1.088   -0.348 -0.488 
 (0.841) (1.031)   (0.463) (0.320) 
Need Factors       
NAEP On or Above Basic Level (%)   0.835**  0.473* 0.489* 
   (0.292)  (0.203) (0.235) 
High School Graduation Rate   -0.143  -0.093** -0.093* 
   (0.096)  (0.035) (0.040) 
Portion of Minority Students    -2.870  -2.571*** -2.615*** 
   (1.640)  (0.555) (0.605) 
Poverty Rate   0.067  -0.668*** -0.645*** 
 
  (0.358)  (0.176) (0.167) 
Resource Factors       
Per-pupil Expenditure (in thousand)    3.042 0.457 0.301 
 
   (1.965) (1.265) (1.346) 
       
Constant 32.620** 32.589** 35.987 -11.330 58.723*** 61.807*** 
 (10.574) (13.199) (51.289) (20.447) (15.731) (14.723)        
Observations 62 62 59 62 59 59 
R-squared 0.549 0.549 0.579 0.382 0.785 0.787 
Number of States 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant level * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the participants of Individual Tax-credits/deductions 
relative to the public-school enrollment within state in year t. Two time-invariant variables the 
Teacher Union Strength and the Population Density are omitted from the estimation. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models 





Chapter 3 7 
Supplying Choice: An Analysis of School Participation Decisions in Voucher Programs in 
DC, Indiana, and Louisiana 
 
Introduction 
Private school choice programs have proliferated across the United States since the 1990’s 
(EdChoice, 2017). They include three different designs for supporting access to private 
schooling: school vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, and Education Savings Accounts. From the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice (pilot) Program, which served 341 students in 19908, to the Florida 
Tax-Credit Scholarship Program, which enrolled almost 100,000 students in the spring of 20179, 
private school choice programs have been considered a policy solution that aims to address 
educational quality and equity concerns by introducing competitive pressures, funding individual 
students rather than schools, and empowering families to control their child’s educational 
experience (Friedman, 1955).  
The core hypothesis behind private school choice is that market-oriented programs will 
have positive effects on student achievement by a) providing more opportunities for students to 
attend high quality private schools, and b) allowing parents to choose the schools that best fit 
their children’s particular needs. The underlying assumption that the average quality of the 
private schools that accept voucher students would exceed the average of all the local public 
                                                 
7 This chapter is co-authored with Corey A. DeAngelis and Patrick J. Wolf. 
8 EdChoice: Wisconsin – Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, available at 
https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/wisconsin-milwaukee-parental-choice-
program/. 






schools, and those private schools would be more effective in improving student learning, 
however, is uncertain. Systematic reviews of the participant effects of private school choice on 
student test scores suggest that effects tend to be positive but also small and inconsistent, 
especially in the U.S. (e.g. Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016; Epple, Romano & Urquiola, 
2015). The answer to the question of what effect school choice has on student test scores tends to 
be: “It depends.” One factor it likely depends upon is the quality of supply of choice schools.  
Most empirical studies of private school choice programs have focused on demand side 
considerations of student achievement and parent preferences. Only a few choice studies have 
considered the supply side: the schools receiving voucher students (e.g. McShane, 2015). The 
studies of participating choice schools that do exist are merely descriptive. As a result, little 
attention has been paid to the supply side of voucher programs; specifically, the supply of 
schools under differing regulatory environments. The public, scholars, and policymakers have 
little systematic knowledge regarding what type of schools participate in voucher programs, why 
they do so, and what the implications might be for student achievement.  
This chapter remedies this shortcoming in the literature by analyzing what school 
characteristics predict participation in private school voucher programs in multiple states. 
Specifically, we estimate the key factors that drive schools’ choices to participate based on cross-
sectional data from the 2014-15 school year from the private school voucher programs in the 
District of Columbia (D.C.), Louisiana, and Indiana. This chapter shows that schools with lower 
tuition, smaller enrollment, and higher minority-density student populations tend to be more 
likely to participate in voucher programs. Schools with those features normally are considered 
“low quality” schools. All else equal, private schools with religious affiliations are more likely to 





This chapter makes substantial contributions to both the scholarly and practitioner fields. 
A better understanding of the supply side of voucher programs will help new and existing school 
choice programs refine their quality constraints regarding market entry. Our analysis also 
provides scholars and policymakers with a new approach to understanding how voucher program 
effects are mediated by the quality of schools induced to participate. 
Prior Studies of School Voucher Programs in the U.S. 
Hundreds of evaluations have assessed the effect of school choice on various outcomes. 
School voucher, tax-credit scholarship, and Education Savings Account (ESA) programs, all of 
which provide public subsidies to families that allow them to choose a private school for their 
child, have proliferated across the country over the past few decades. Currently, 52 such 
programs have been enacted in 28 states plus the District of Columbia (EdChoice, 2017).  
Dozens of empirical studies focus on the impact of private school choice on student 
outcomes as defined by student test scores, attainment and college enrollment (e.g. Cowen et al., 
2013; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999; Howell et al., 2002; Rouse, 1998; Witte et al., 2014; Wolf 
et al., 2013). A recent meta-analysis finds that choice programs tend to have positive and 
statistically significant test score effects, especially in math, when they are publicly funded, and 
when they take place outside of the U.S. (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016). Other, less 
comprehensive, reviews of the test score effects of school choice (e.g. Epple, Romano, & 
Urquiola, 2015; Rouse & Barrow, 2008; Wolf, 2008) conclude that results tilt positive but only 
most clearly for African American students. These reviews all agree that the size and statistical 
significance of school voucher impacts on test scores vary substantially from place to place, 
suggesting that the kinds of private schools that compose a given voucher program influence its 





Frederick Hess (2010) argues that school choice programs have filled seats in existing 
private schools but have failed to entice new high quality private schools to open. Similarly, John 
Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) point out that a narrow focus on the demand-side of the 
educational market will fail to provide parents with abundant high quality choices. In Michael 
McShane’s edited book New and Better Schools: the Supply Side of School Choice (2015), 
private school choice researchers and practitioners summarize the challenges that choice 
programs face in creating marketplaces to drive improvement in the education sector. The twelve 
chapters provide a broad discussion of how to improve the scale and quality of the supply of 
private schools participating in choice programs; however, they are mostly suggestive and 
theoretical, failing to provide robust solutions to enhance the supply side of private school choice 
programs. In particular, the literature does not describe the characteristics of participating 
institutions, how the participating schools are different from their non-participating counterparts, 
and why specific schools choose to participate in voucher programs. 
Some empirical studies fill this gap by providing descriptive information about the types 
of private schools that decide to participate in school voucher programs. Religiosity plays an 
important role in enrolling choice students. By 2011, 107 private schools served voucher 
students in Milwaukee, with 86 percent of them ascribing to one of 10 different religious 
affiliations (McShane et al., 2012). Moreover, Catholic schools enroll a majority of voucher 
students in most voucher programs (Wolf et al., 2010; Austin, 2015). Howell et al. (2006) find 
that urban voucher-receiving private schools tend to have small class sizes, minimal facilities, 
and few special programs for disadvantaged students. Austin (2015) reports that participating 
schools in the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program (ICSP) have larger enrollments than non-





schools, as measured by declining enrollment and lower tuition rates, are more likely to 
participate in the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). 
Private schools with longer experience participating in a voucher program are more likely 
to offer special programs for struggling students (Stewart, Jacob, & Jensen, 2012). Ford (2011) 
analyzes the exit patterns of private schools from the MPCP, finding that the schools with lower 
enrollment growth rates are more likely to leave. His follow-up study of Milwaukee voucher 
schools reports that schools experiencing enrollment growth had significantly higher proportions 
of students achieve proficiency than the schools that experienced enrollment declines, suggesting 
that private institutions with higher quality tend to attract larger enrollments compared to lower-
performing schools. This advantage fades out, however, after controlling for the descriptive 
characteristics of schools such as years in the program, proportion of the student body made up 
of voucher students, and religious affiliation (Ford, 2016). 
A small number of studies have examined potential barriers to school participation in 
school choice programs. A recent survey of leaders at participating and non-participating private 
schools in Louisiana, Indiana, and Florida suggests that program regulation is a major concern 
(Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015). Twenty-six percent of the leaders of non-participating 
private schools in Florida, 62 percent of them in Indiana, and 64 percent of them in Louisiana 
listed “Future regulation that might come with participation” as their major reason for not 
participating in the program (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015, 17-19). These responses 
suggest that private schools are highly sensitive to regulatory creep in making participation 
decisions regarding school choice programs. Stuit and Doan (2013) generate regulatory burden 
scores for the private school choice programs in the U.S. They find that private school 





that revenue constraints, shortages of facility space, and state regulations are the major concerns 
for school leaders in determining whether to participate in a voucher program. 
The school voucher research base is a tale of two literatures. The empirical research on 
the effects of voucher programs on student outcomes is broad, deep, rigorous and causal. The 
empirical research on what kinds of schools participate in school voucher programs is relatively 
thin and descriptive. Since the private schools in a voucher program are, to a significant extent, 
the program itself, the lack of analyses of school participation in private school choice programs 
is a hole that cries to be filled. We take a step in that direction by examining school participation 
in three private school voucher programs that operate under different policy contexts. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Studies examining the effectiveness of private school choice programs are static in that 
they examine initiatives as they exist. While that approach is sound from a program evaluation 
standpoint, since a school choice program is what it is, these studies may underestimate the 
potential effects choice has on students since individual schools choose whether to participate in 
voucher programs. We customize a decision-making model for the specific case of private 
schools participating in a voucher program by considering the benefit of additional funding and 
the costs tied to state-driven regulation. 
Benefits of Participating in Voucher Programs 
Intuitively, the most obvious economic benefit for schools participating in choice 
programs is to acquire additional resources by receiving voucher students. Of course, financial 
benefits will vary across schools based on their specific cost structures and capacities. The 
further a given school’s enrollment is from full capacity, the lower the marginal cost is for 





an institution to participate is the voucher amount minus the average cost per student. Almost all 
schools have a financial incentive to participate in a voucher program so long as they are not at 
full capacity and have tuition levels at or below the voucher amount. Other than receiving 
voucher-based revenue, we expect that schools, especially those small schools, will achieve 
greater economies of scale by participating in a voucher program, even when the maximum 
voucher amount does not fully cover the average cost of educating a student at that school.  
Furthermore, private schools may still elect to participate in voucher programs even if 
they lose money on each student, since the schools gain the nonfinancial benefit of social 
responsibility or what organizational theorists call “purposive benefits” (Wilson, 1989). We 
suspect that religious schools value social responsibility more than secular ones.  
Costs of Participating in Voucher Programs 
There are two types of costs for schools participating in voucher programs. Participating 
schools must provide tuition subsidies when per-pupil costs exceed the state-determined voucher 
amount, as few voucher programs allow schools to charge families top-up fees above the 
voucher maximum. Thus, schools with higher per-pupil costs have a financial incentive not to 
participate in voucher programs. The other type of cost is the additional regulatory burden. Many 
voucher programs require private schools to administer state standardized tests, undergo 
financial audits, surrender admissions policies to the state, and conform to teacher certification 
standards. Complying with these requirements costs money. 
Regulatory burdens will have an absolute cost and a relative cost for private schools 
within the same location. Each voucher program has a consistent set of regulations that apply to 
all private schools within the program’s geographic reach. In that sense, the costs of compliance 





and vary for individual schools within a given location. Schools that are vastly different from the 
traditional public school model will face much higher regulatory costs associated with necessary 
adjustments. For example, if an institution’s educational model did not rely on standardized tests 
before, switching into a voucher program that requires standardized testing would be relatively 
more costly than it would be for a private school used to testing its students.  
School Participation Decision Making Model 
As shown in Figure 3.1, schools make their participation decision by comparing the 
additional costs of tuition subsidization and regulatory compliance associated with participating 
with the additional benefits of voucher revenue, economies of scale and enhanced social 
responsibility. Theoretically, schools perceiving benefits exceeding the costs will decide to 
participate in voucher programs. These schools likely have a lower tuition level and a smaller 
enrollment size, or are eager for financial support and are willing to sacrifice some school 
autonomy for additional funding. The private schools that meet those criteria are likely to be 
lower-quality academically (Stewart, Jacob, & Jensen, 2012). They also are more likely to be 
religious with an explicit mission to serve disadvantaged students, no matter the cost. 
Our theoretical model results in three hypotheses regarding the school voucher 
participation decision. All else equal: 
1. Schools with higher quality will be less likely to participate; 
2. Catholic schools will be more likely to participate; 






Figure 3.1 Cost Benefit Decision Making Model  
 
 
Descriptions of Programs 
We focus on three school voucher programs: the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, the 
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program, and the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). 
DC Opportunity Scholarship Program 
The D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP) was established in January 2004 
as the first federally-funded school choice program in the United States. Students must live in 
D.C. in families that receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program (SNAP) benefits or be at 
or below 185 percent of the poverty line ($44,955 for a family of four in 2016-17). Students are 
given priority in receiving a scholarship if they have a sibling in the program or come from low-
quality public school. 
Additional Costs 
1. Tuition  
2. Regulations for Participants 
Additional Benefits 
1. Additional Financing Support (Voucher 
Amount) 
2. Decreased per-pupil expenditures  




Costs > Benefits 
- Not eager for money 
- Higher regulatory burden 
Participants 
Costs < Benefits 
- Need the money 







The average voucher amount is $8,452 for K-8 students and $12,679 for high school 
students. Even the higher voucher amount for high school is only about 47 percent of the per 
pupil funding amount in D.C. public schools. In 2016-17, 1,166 students and 42 private schools 
participated in the program. The average voucher value in 2016-17 is projected to be $9,472. In 
order to participate in the DC OSP, private schools must require that teachers in core subjects 
hold a bachelor’s degree. They also must administer a nationally norm-referenced exam to their 
voucher students.  
The initial gold-standard experimental evaluation of the OSP mandated by Congress 
concluded that participation in the program led to significantly higher graduation rates (Wolf et 
al., 2013). An evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the DC OSP found a benefit to cost ratio of 
2.62, indicating that each dollar spent on the program produced 2.62 dollars in benefits (Wolf & 
McShane, 2013). On the other hand, a follow-up experimental evaluation of the program 
reported that student test scores in math were lower one year after receiving an Opportunity 
Scholarship (Dynarski et al. 2017). 
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program 
The Indiana Choice Scholarship Program (ICSP) started in 2011 and is now the largest 
school voucher program in the country. In order to qualify for the program, students must come 
from a family that earns no more than 150 percent of the federal lunch program limit ($67,433 
for a family of four in the 2016-17 school year). Students must be assigned to or be leaving a 
public school with an "F" grade. If a student comes from a family that earns up to 200 percent of 
the federal lunch program amount ($89,910 for a family of four in 2016-17), they qualify for the 





In 2016-17, 313 schools and 34,299 students participated in the program. The average 
voucher value was $4,024 in 2015-16 (less than half of the per-pupil spending in public schools). 
The ICSP is the most accessible program in our study, as 54 percent of students across the state 
are income-eligible. 
In order to participate in the program, schools must report their graduation rates and 
ratings based on the Indiana Statewide Testing for Educational Progress (ISTEP). If they are 
rated a "D" or "F" for two years in a row, they are no longer eligible for the program. Schools 
must administer the state tests, submit financial reporting and allow the state to have full access 
to their property in order to observe classrooms. Administering the state test is customary for 
most private schools in Indiana because the Hoosier State requires state testing for any school, 
public or private, that wishes to participate in interscholastic extracurricular activities including 
sports. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) started as a pilot program in New Orleans in 
2008 and expanded statewide in 2012. Students must be at or below 250 percent of the poverty 
line ($60,750 for a family of four in 2016-17) in order to qualify for the program. Students must 
have attended a public school that was graded as a C, D, F, or T in the previous school year. If 
the student is entering kindergarten, they must be assigned to a C, D, F, or T10 school for the 
current school year. During the admission lottery for oversubscribed schools, students at a D or F 
school receive priority over other students. 
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The voucher amount is equal to the state share of per pupil funding in the student’s home 
public school district or the private school’s tuition amount, whichever is less. In 2015-16, 7,110 
students and 121 schools participated in the program and the average voucher value was $5,856. 
Twenty percent of the K-12 students in Louisiana were eligible for the program. 
In order to participate in the LSP, private schools must use an open admissions process in 
enrolling scholarship recipients and administer the same state examinations required by the 
public school district. The schools must also maintain a “quality” curriculum that is equal to or 
better than that of public schools, as judged by the state department of education. Private schools 
are prohibited from charging students a top-up above the voucher amount. Failure to comply 
with these requirements can lead to the school’s removal from the program. 
Since the statewide expansion of the program in 2012, there have been several studies of 
it by the School Choice Demonstration Project (SCDP). Mills and Wolf (2017) find that the LSP 
had a negative effect on student math achievement after two years. However, Egalite, Mills, and 
Wolf (2016) report a positive impact of the program on racial integration, especially in public 
schools previously under court orders to integrate. In addition, Egalite (2016) finds some positive 
competitive effects of the program on the achievement of public school students in Louisiana. 
Further, the program saves money for the state and local school districts (Trivitt & DeAngelis, 
2016). 
Table 3.1 outlines attributes relevant to the participation decisions for private schools 
within each of the three voucher programs included in this report. In particular, we present the 
financial benefit for participating private schools within each program and the average funding 





burdens associated with participation: testing, open-admissions, financial reporting, prohibition 
of parental copay, and teacher certification requirements. 
 
Table 3.1 
Participation Costs and Benefits for Each Voucher Program 
Feature D.C. Indiana Louisiana 
Date Enacted 2004 2011 2008 
Average Funding Relative to Public School 47% 42% 54% 
Eligibility Rate 35% 54% 20% 
Testing Requirement Y Y Y 
Open-Admissions Process   Y 
Financial Reporting Y Y Y 
Parental Copay Prohibited   Y 
Teacher Requirements Y   
Ranking of State Laws for School Choice Voucher Programs 
(Center for Education Reform,2014) 
B A C 
Regulatory Burden Score Ranking (Stuit & Doan, 2013). 7 2 5 
Notes: Ranking of State Laws for School Choice Voucher Programs ranges from A to F with A 
indicating the lowest regulatory burden and F indicating the highest regulatory burden. Ranking 
of Regulatory Burden Score is taken from Table4 in Stuit & Doan (2013). School choice 
regulations: Red tape or red herring. Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Institute. It ranges 
from 1 to 13 with 1 indicating the highest regulatory burden and 13 indicating the lowest 
regulatory burden. 
 
The findings in Table 3.1 mirror those in the 2014 voucher program scorecard released 
by the Center for Education Reform.11 The scorecard examines the regulatory freedom 
experienced by private schools in voucher programs in 15 locations and found that Indiana had 
the least regulatory burden, scoring an A. Washington D.C. scored a B, while Louisiana scored a 
C. The findings also align at least somewhat with the Stuit and Doan (2013) ranking of 
regulatory burden scores for thirteen of the private school choice programs in the U.S., which 
rank Indiana as least burdensome (ranked 2nd) and DC as the most burdensome (ranked 7th) of 
the three programs included in this report.  
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Private schools in Louisiana and DC face the largest costs for participation, while serving 
voucher students costs private schools in Indiana the least. Thus, we expect a significantly lower 
probability of participating for schools in Louisiana and DC after controlling for school 
characteristics. 
Specifically, private schools participating in the DC Opportunity Scholarship have 
additional requirements of state testing, financial reporting, and, as indicated by the low 
eligibility rate, less-advantaged voucher students. The DC voucher program also has additional 
teacher certificate requirements; thus we expect DC Catholic schools (which do not require 
certification) are less apt to participate relative to Catholic schools in Indiana and Louisiana.  
Private schools participating in the LSP have additional requirements of state testing, 
open-admissions, financial reporting, prohibition of parental copay, and, as indicated by the low 
eligibility rate, the least-advantaged voucher students. On the other hand, private schools 
participating in the LSP tend to receive slightly more public funding, on average, relative to 
those in DC and Indiana. Because high-quality private schools appear to have the most to risk in 
Louisiana, we expect that they will be the least likely to participate in their voucher program.  
Private schools in Indiana appear to have much lower costs tied to their participation 
decision. In particular, they do not have to use an open-admissions process or additional teaching 
requirements, and are allowed to accept parental funds above and beyond the voucher amount. 
Additionally, private schools in Indiana can benefit from a large increase in demand from 
students who are relatively less costly to educate, as indicated by the comparatively high 
eligibility rate of 54 percent. However, private schools in Indiana seem to experience a slightly 
lower financial benefit per student, as indicated by an average voucher value that is only 42 





voucher program are not compelled to accept the voucher amount as full-payment. Because high-
quality private schools appear to have the least to risk in Indiana, we do not expect quality levels 
to be related to program participation decisions in that state. 
The decision makers who shaped these three private school choice programs did not 
operate in a vacuum. State context is important to how choice programs are designed and that 
context varied across DC, Indiana, and Louisiana. In DC, President Bush and congressional 
leaders designed the Opportunity Scholarship Program as a pilot project to learn how private 
school choice might affect low-income families in the nation’s capital (Stewart & Wolf, 2014). 
For Indiana, the Choice Scholarship Program was the state’s second private school choice 
program, building on a limited tax-credit scholarship program launched in 2010. Thus, the 
Indiana program represented a policy breakthrough long in the works for Hoosiers (Austin 
2015). 
Louisiana has been home to a large individual tax deduction program since 2008. Up to 
$5,000 in education expenses, including private school tuition, can be deducted from the family’s 
state taxable income. Private schools in Louisiana benefit from the tax deduction policy 
whenever the parents of students attending their school claim the tax deduction, as over 100,000 
families did in 2012, because it makes private school tuition more affordable to middle class 
families (EdChoice, 2017). The tax deduction policy does not benefit low-income families in the 
state, however, because they rarely itemize their tax deductions. In enacting the Louisiana 
Scholarship Program, policymakers sought an additional private school choice initiative 
designed specifically and intentionally to serve low-income students whose families did not 





Data and Sample Description 
The data used in this report includes participating school lists in three locations for the 
2014-15 school year and school-level characteristics linking to the decision of whether to 
participate in a voucher program. The participation status of each school is obtained from the 
annual report of the voucher program for each state (Indiana Department of Education, 2016; 
Louisiana Department of Education, 2014). According to the reports, 492 K-12 private schools 
received voucher students across the three locations in the 2014-15 school year: 47 in the District 
of Columbia, 314 in Indiana, and 131 in Louisiana.  
Measures of school characteristics were obtained from the publicly available Private 
School Universe Survey (PSS) database for the most recent school year of 2013-2014. The PSS 
is a nation-wide survey of all the private schools in the U.S. conducted every two years since 
1988-89. Information missing from the PSS was collected from lists provided by nationwide 
private school associations, state departments of education, and other sources. In the 2013-14 
survey, 42 DC private schools, 329 Indiana private schools12 and 284 private schools in 
Louisiana were included, for a total of 655 private schools. We used information from the 
Private School Review website for 12 DC OSP participating schools that were not included in 
the PSS (2013-14), resulting in 667 schools with information on school characteristics. 
In addition to the PSS, we collected 2015-16 school tuition levels by searching school 
websites and calling the schools, when necessary. We combine the tuition information along 
with the PSS survey data to describe the school characteristics for both voucher participating 
schools and non-participating schools. Descriptive statistics of school characteristics are in Table 
3.2.  
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Program participation rates differed across locations. The rate was 78 percent for DC, 70 
percent for Indiana, and 33 percent for Louisiana, indicating that private schools in Louisiana 
were particularly unlikely to participate in the LSP.  
Lastly, we use data from the Great Schools13 website for our analysis of the relationship 
between parent reviews and program participation. The original scale takes on integer values 
from one to five, with five the most positive. We aggregate a school’s Great Schools Review 
score into a continuous variable that ranges from one to five by weighting it on the frequency of 
parent’s rating on each score. The aggregated Great School Review score has a mean of 4.18 
with the standard deviation of 0.698, indicating a small variation between schools. 
Table 3.3 describes the quality of the data we use to conduct this study. Overall, the 
private schools that are included in our report represent almost 70 percent of the private school 
population in the three states, indicating a highly representative sample. 
 
Table 3.2 
School Characteristics Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Overall Tuition ($1,000) 515 7.264 6.102 1.900 49.666 
  DC  51 18.600 12.246 3.255 49.666 
  Indiana  224 6.101 2.929 1.90 20.645 
  Louisiana  240 5.941 3.202 2.000 19.660 
Great School Review Score  483 4.186 0.698 1 5 
  DC  40 4.276 0.561 2.923 5 
  Indiana  221 4.293 0.749 1 5 
  Louisiana  222 4.063 0.648 1 5 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100) 665 0.351 0.420 0.010 2.828 
Catholic School 667 0.496 0.500 0 1 
Elementary-Only School 667 0.657 0.475 0 1 
Library or Media Center 667 1.895 0.307 1 2 
Percent of Minority Students 661 0.284 0.317 0 1 
Length of School Day in Total Hours 665 6.997 0.508 5.33 11 
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Sample Descriptive Analysis 
 Overall DC Indiana Louisiana 
(1) Count of Participating Schools 492 47 314 131 
(2) Count of PSS Schools (2013-14) 667 54 329 284 
(3) Matched Participating Schools 366 42 231 93 
    Participating Schools Match Rate= (3)/(1) 74% 89% 74% 71% 
(4) Program Participation Rate=(3)/(2) 54.87% 77.78% 70.21% 32.75% 
(5) Count of Schools with Tuition Rate 515 51 224 240 
    Tuition Match Rate = (5)/(2) 77.21% 94.44% 68.09% 84.51% 
(6) Count of Schools with Great Schools Review Score 483 40 221 222 
    Great Schools Review Score Match Rate= (6)/(2) 72.41% 74.07% 67.17% 78.17% 
 
Analytical Methods 
To test our hypotheses, we apply linear probability models to estimate the school’s 
participation choice. At the school level, the participation equation is: 
𝑦 = 𝑎0 + 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊
′. 𝜷 + 𝑪𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒊
′. 𝜸 + 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒊
′. 𝜹 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝑖𝑐 
 (1) 
The dependent variable of interest, the likelihood that school i participates in a voucher 
program in the year 2014-15 is a function of school quality indicators (the amount of the school 
tuition, average cohort enrollment size, and school revenue), school religious affiliation, and 
other school characteristics. We conduct the analyses including state fixed effect 𝜌𝑖 and city 
fixed effect 𝜎𝑖, and cluster standard errors at the city level c. 
Four independent variables of interest are used separately and in combination in the 
analysis. One set of models disaggregates total revenue into its separate components of tuition 
level and enrollment level.14 A second set of models combine school tuition with average cohort 
enrollment to produce a “revenue” variable that represents both the price and quantity of each 
school’s educational service. A third set of models replaces tuition and enrollment with each 
                                                 
14
 We use average grade cohort enrollment as the variable in our models because key control 






school’s Great Schools review score, using reputation as a proxy for school quality. Since we 
anticipate that schools with higher tuition, larger enrollment, and higher Great Schools review 
scores, those normally considered higher-quality schools, will be less likely to participate in a 
given program, we expect that the coefficient estimates for these explanatory variables will be 
negative, especially in Louisiana and DC.  
We first present a model that does not use school-level controls, since including them 
would deteriorate our treatment of interest. If tuition levels reflect several school-level 
characteristics, we may not want to include any controls. Theoretically, if everything that the 
family receives is reflected in the price of the school, a model that controls for all school 
characteristics purchased by tuition would perfectly remove the coefficient on tuition level. 
Nevertheless, we also include a model with school-level controls as a robustness check.  
The variable Enrollment describes school i’s average cohort enrollment (in hundreds), 
which may indicate an economies of scale benefit introduced by accepting additional voucher 
students. If enrollment is a measure of consumer demand, it is also a quality variable of interest. 
As we hypothesize schools with smaller enrollment that have lower marginal costs of admitting 
additional voucher students are more likely to participate in the program, we anticipate that 𝛽2 
will also be negative.  
Additionally, the school participation decision is influenced by other control variables 
included as School Attributes. These control variables are other educational and environment 
characteristics that may influence school i’s overall quality and expenses. We control for school 
institutional characteristics, including an indicator of whether school i is an elementary-only 





We also control for percentage of minority students within a school, whether the school has a 
library or media center, and the average length of a school day.  
Catholic is a binary variable that indicates if school i is a Catholic school. The 
coefficient, 𝛽4, is expected to be positive since religious schools generally show a higher 
willingness to take on social responsibilities. However, we would expect it to be negative for 
OSP, since DC has strict requirements on teacher certification which set additional barriers for 
Catholic schools to participate in the program. 
Along with all the variables described above, 𝜌 in the Equation (1) denotes the specific 
program, j, that the school i, was in, and  refers to the random errors. At the cross-state level, 
we conduct a program fixed effect regression with the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program as 
the default, and would expect a negative sign for the coefficients on the DC and Louisiana 
indicator variables, which refers to a lower participating tendency of private schools in those two 
sites. 
 Results 
This section presents the analytical results of estimations on the school’s participation 
decisions in voucher programs in DC, Louisiana, and Indiana.  
Tuition and Enrollment 
A comparison of means reveals that the tuition levels of participating private schools tend 
to be lower than those that choose not to participate in DC and Louisiana; however the difference 
is only statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in Louisiana, where 
participating private schools have tuition levels that are around $800 lower.  
The revenue variable behaves as expected in our main analysis. Higher revenue is 





models that exclude control variables for school amenities but changes to a positive association 
with participation controlling for the school features that revenue buys. None of the coefficients 
on the revenue variable effect are statistically significant.  
Our primary results that solely include tuition and average cohort enrollment as separate 
variables at the cross state level using state and city fixed effects largely confirm our first 
hypothesis, as shown in Column 2, Table 3.4. We find that schools with higher tuition are less 
likely to choose to participate in voucher programs: a $1,000 increase in school tuition is 
associated with a 0.9 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of participating in a voucher 
program, marginally significant at p<.1. Schools with larger cohort enrollment are also less 
likely to participate in voucher programs, though this association is not statistically significant. 
The effect of tuition fades out after controlling for school characteristics that are related to the 
tuition level, as shown in Column 2 through 8, and the effects of cohort enrollment remain 
negative and insignificant across all the models. Additionally, Column 8 indicates the Catholic 
schools have a higher tendency of participating in voucher programs than non-Catholic schools, 
across all three states, statistically significant at p<.01.  
In the meantime, the coefficients on the state fixed effects of DC and Louisiana are 
consistently negative across all the models, and the magnitude of Louisiana is significantly larger 
than DC, indicating that controlling for school characteristics, private schools in Louisiana and 
DC, the two states that share larger regulatory burdens, are less likely to participate in voucher 
programs than those in Indiana, with the least participation in Louisiana. These results align with 
our expectation. Comparisons of school participation decision making across states reveal similar 





Table 3.5 presents the full linear regression model estimation for each of the states. As a 
result, tuition is negatively associated with school voucher program participation in all three 
states, and attains statistical significance in DC and Indiana. Specifically, a $1,000 increase in 
school tuition is predicted to reduce a school’s likelihood of participating in the DC OSP by 1.9 
percentage points (p<.05), and in the ICSP by 3 percentage points (p<.05), all else equal. The 
average cohort enrollment only predicts school participation in the voucher program in 
Louisiana. Controlling for other school characteristics, an increase of 10 students in average 
cohort enrollment reduces a school’s likelihood of participating in the LSP by 2.8 percentage 
points (p<.05).  
Catholic schools in Indiana and Louisiana are 41.1 and 24.2 percentage points, 
respectively, more likely to participate in voucher programs than their non-Catholic counterparts. 
Catholic private schools in DC have less likelihood of participating in the DC OSP, though this 
association is not statistically significant at p<.05.  
Lastly, private schools with a higher proportion of minority students are more likely to 
participate in the LSP, statistically significant at p<.01. On the other hand, such schools are less 
likely to participate in the OSP and ICSP, though this association fails to reach statistical 
significance. 
We also adopt Probit models with city fixed effects for a robustness check, restricting our 
analytical samples to schools that have counterparts within the same city. Those schools are 
largely the urban and high-tuition schools. The results from Probit models, as reported in 
Appendix B, are similar to those we obtained from the linear probability model in Table 3.4 and 









School Quality on Participation Decision, Across States  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






















































0.052 0.025 0.054 0.018 -0.124 -0.12 
 
  
(0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.068) (0.084) (0.077) 
Secondary School 
  
0.047 0.109 0.019 0.052 -0.171* -0.072 
 
  
(0.097) (0.118) (0.092) (0.130) (0.102) (0.117) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 
  
0.100 0.060 0.053 0.034 0.044 0.011 
 
  
(0.070) (0.078) (0.068) (0.075) (0.054) (0.049) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 
    
-0.009 0.09 -0.075 0.005 
 
    
(0.087) (0.084) (0.115) (0.123) 
Percentage of Minority Student 
    
0.458** 0.314 0.410*** 0.335*** 
 
    
(0.222) (0.219) (0.113) (0.102) 
Catholic School 
      
0.269*** 0.267*** 
 
      
(0.069) (0.064) 
DC -0.142** -0.091* -0.127* -0.068 -0.441*** -0.270* -0.249* -0.175 
 (0.064) (0.055) (0.070) (0.044) (0.144) (0.141) (0.134) (0.111) 
LA -0.511*** -0.537*** -0.479*** -0.542*** -0.730*** -0.697*** -0.644 -0.596 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.070) (0.072) (0.158) (0.155) (0.400) (0.401) 
Constant 1.278** 1.027*** 0.61 0.613 0.012 0.569 0.636 0.762* 
 (0.520) (0.017) (0.678) (0.537) (0.547) (0.493) (0.615) (0.417) 
         
N 514 514 511 511 509 509 509 509 
Adjusted R Squared 0.249 0.513 0.26 0.528 0.306 0.548 0.346 0.581 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 






GreatSchools Review Score 
GreatSchools reviews provide a more direct measure of private school quality. We were 
able to obtain scores from 40 schools in DC, 217 schools in Indiana, and 221 schools in 
Louisiana. Table 3.6 indicates a potential negative relationship between Great Schools review 
scores and school decisions to participate in a voucher program. The coefficient on the effect of a 
school’s review school and the likelihood of participation is negative in DC and Louisiana and 
indicates that a one-unit increase in Great Schools review score is associated with a 12 
percentage point lower likelihood of participating in the LSP and a 5.1 percentage point lower 
likelihood of participating in the DC OSP. In Indiana, the relationship reverses and a one-unit 
increase in Great Schools Review score is associated with a 0.3 percentage point higher tendency 
of participating in the ICSP. However, these effects are not statistically significant. This might be 
due to the small variance of the Great Schools Review score. More than three quarters of schools 
in our sample have a Great School Review score larger than 4, meaning there is little variance in 
the rating and therefore little likelihood of a consistent relationship with the participation 
decision. Results remain similar after controlling for school characteristics. 
State fixed effects indicate that private schools in DC and Louisiana are less likely to 
participate in voucher programs compared to schools in Indiana. Schools in Louisiana, the state 









School Quality on Participation Decision, by states 
 DC 
Participant 
Indiana  Louisiana  
 Participant Participant 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue (Ln) -0.046  0.025  -0.045 
 
 (0.052)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
 
Tuition ($1,000)  -0.019**   -0.030** 
 
-0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.01) 
 
(0.009) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100)  0.091  -0.021 
 
-0.282** 
  (0.082)  (0.09) 
 
(0.122) 
Elementary School -0.183 -0.224 -0.216 -0.223 -0.076 -0.078 
 (0.140) (0.150) (0.147) (0.16) (0.124) (0.105) 
Secondary School -0.134 -0.129 -0.250 -0.072 -0.140 0.049 
 (0.166) (0.181) (0.163) (0.17) (0.156) (0.164) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours -0.050 0.015 0.170 0.198 0.019 0.022 
 (0.079) (0.056) (0.119) (0.13) (0.065) (0.065) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 0.185 0.314 -0.182 -0.105 0.043 0.026 
 (0.274) (0.239) (0.168) (0.13) (0.198) (0.193) 
Percentage of Minority Student 0.032 -0.202 -0.042 -0.117 0.617*** 0.553*** 
 (0.193) (0.191) (0.177) (0.13) (0.155) (0.137) 
Catholic School 0.085 -0.112 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.210** 0.242** 
 (0.114) (0.122) (0.108) (0.11) (0.105) (0.098) 
Constant 1.649**  0.641 -0.322 -0.290 0.336 -0.273 
 (0.627) (0.626) (1.182) (1.01) (0.896) (0.513) 
       
N 47 47 223 223 240 240 
Adjusted R Squared 0.081 0.194 0.283 0.314 0.235 0.53 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Linear probability in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have participated in the targeted program. All 











Linear Probability of Great Schools Review Score on Participation Decision 
 Overall DC Indiana Louisiana Overall DC Indiana Louisiana 
 Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant 
Great Schools Review Score (Weighted) -0.051 -0.051 0.003 -0.118 -0.018 -0.188 0.024 -0.039 
 (0.051) (0.138) (0.042) (0.109) (0.612) (0.129) (0.583) (0.634) 
Catholic     0.276*** 0.206* 0.315*** 0.284*** 
     (0.000) (0.079) (0.005) 0.000  
Elementary School     -0.118 0.07 -0.157 -0.146 
     (0.128) (0.708) (0.203) (0.129) 
Secondary School     -0.173* -0.036 -0.068 -0.315* 
     (0.078) (0.857) (0.631) (0.050) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours     -0.04 -0.13 -0.066 -0.026 
     (0.717) (0.566) (0.448) (0.906) 
Has Library or Library Media Center     0.347*** 0.091 0.016 0.582*** 
     (0.001) (0.605) (0.882) (0.000) 
Percentage of Minority Student     0.032 -0.036 0.155 0.043 
     (0.581) (0.696) (0.224) (0.621) 
DC -0.156***    -0.485***    
 (0.006)    (0.000)    
LA -1.037***    -1.066***    
 (0.037)    (0.000)    
Constant 1.222*** 1.067* 0.983*** 0.422 1.244*** 1.067* 0.008 0.44 
 (0.224) (0.590) (0.212) (0.392) (0.231) (0.590) (0.211) (0.395) 
N 478 40 217 221 475 38 216 221 
R Squared 0.575 0.006 0.518 0.394 0.643 0.21 0.623 0.52 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Linear probability in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have participated in the targeted program. All 





Discussion and Policy Implications 
The results in our model without school-level controls largely confirm our hypotheses. 
The relationship between the level of tuition required of private schools and their decision to 
participate in a voucher program is negative. The results in our model with school-level controls 
also show a negative relationship, however statistical significance only remains for the negative 
effect of tuition levels on participation in the DC and Indiana programs. This is likely because 
controlling for school-level characteristics diminishes our treatment of interest if these 
characteristics are reflected in the cost of attending the school. The effect of cohort enrollment, a 
potential indicator of quality, on school participation decisions appears to vary across the three 
locations. In DC the effect of enrollment on participation is positive but not statistically 
significant. In Indiana it is negative but not significant. The relationship between cohort 
enrollment and school participation is negative and statistically significant in Louisiana. Higher-
enrollment private schools are much less interested in participating in the school choice program 
in Louisiana than in Indiana or DC, where cohort enrollment levels do not clearly factor into the 
decision.  
Our analysis of Great Schools review scores shows a negative, though statistically 
insignificant, relationship with program participation, likely due to the small variation on Great 
Schools Review scores among the schools. Catholic schools consistently display a significantly 
higher likelihood of participating in school choice programs, after controlling for school 
characteristics. Private schools in DC and Louisiana have a significantly smaller likelihood of 
participating in voucher programs than in Indiana, with the least participation in Louisiana, 





Yet, our analysis is limited by the data availability. First, we only observed school 
participations in the DC OSP, LSP, and Indiana’s Choice Scholarship in the 2014-15 school 
year. The school participation patterns of those programs might correlate with some external 
shock during that year, and might change over time. Second, the measure of school quality, 
including school tuition cost, enrollment size, and the GreatSchool Review Scores were obtained 
after the program was enacted, thus could be endogenous with the program enactment.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on understanding the supply side of 
voucher programs: what kind of schools are receiving the voucher students, and what school 
characteristics predict the likelihood of participating in a private school choice program. We 
demonstrate a simple model of rational decision-making to allow us to illustrate what kinds of 
private schools will and will not choose to participate in a private school choice program. Our 
chapter contributes to an improved understanding of the supply side of voucher programs that 
can assist engineers of new and existing school choice programs. In particular, policymakers 
should be cautious about the consequences of attempting to control the quality of schools within 
a voucher program. In attempting to control quality through regulation, decision-makers may 
inadvertently limit the number of high-quality choices available to disadvantaged students across 
the United States. A second key lesson is that the effects of proxy measures of school quality on 
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Appendix Table 3.1 
The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Linear Probability Model, DC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) -0.018  -0.049  -0.04  -0.046  
 (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.053)  (0.052)  
Tuition ($1,000)  -0.005  -0.010*  -0.015**  -0.019**  
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100)  0.09  0.092  0.071  0.091 
  (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.080)  (0.082) 
Elementary School   -0.056 -0.096 -0.142 -0.239 -0.183 -0.224 
   (0.127) (0.138) (0.127) (0.151) (0.140) (0.150) 
Secondary School   0.016 -0.022 -0.076 -0.173 -0.134 -0.129 
   (0.160) (0.158) (0.146) (0.173) (0.166) (0.181) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours   -0.048 -0.027 -0.051 0.003 -0.05 0.015 
   (0.068) (0.047) (0.083) (0.051) (0.079) (0.056) 
Has Library or Library Media Center     0.2 0.273 0.185 0.314 
     (0.250) (0.246) (0.274) (0.239) 
Percentage of Minority Student     0.079 -0.158 0.032 -0.202 
     (0.235) (0.149) (0.193) (0.191) 
Catholic School       0.085 -0.112 
       (0.114) (0.122) 
Constant 1.091** 0.839*** 1.966*** 1.178*** 1.514** 0.721 1.649**  0.641 
 (0.524) (0.070) (0.725) (0.413) (0.573) (0.622) (0.627) (0.626) 
         
         
N 51 51 49 49 47 47 47 47 
Adjusted R Squared 0.004 0.034 0.037 0.104 0.069 0.18 0.081 0.194 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Linear probability in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have participated in the targeted program. All 








Appendix Table 3.2 
The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Linear Probability Model, Indiana 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) 0.087**  0.085**  0.087  0.025  
 (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.057)  (0.060)  
Tuition ($1,000)  -0.032**  -0.037**  -0.038**  -0.030** 
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100) 0.205***  0.142**  0.11  -0.021 
  (0.048)  (0.07)  (0.068)  (0.085) 
Elementary School   0.039 0.038 0.048 0.047 -0.216 -0.223 
   (0.114) (0.13) (0.115) (0.137) (0.147) (0.162) 
Secondary School   -0.016 0.125 -0.017 0.159 -0.25 -0.072 
   (0.116) (0.129) (0.127) (0.141) (0.163) (0.168) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 0.174* 0.217* 0.178* 0.223* 0.17 0.198 
   (0.103) (0.127) (0.100) (0.125) (0.119) (0.128) 
Has Library or Library Media Center   -0.105 0.007 -0.182 -0.105 
     (0.165) (0.158) (0.168) (0.126) 
Percentage of Minority Student   -0.047 -0.184 -0.042 -0.117 
     (0.208) (0.2) (0.177) (0.13) 
Catholic School       0.401*** 0.411*** 
       (0.108) (0.109) 
Constant -0.069 1.057*** -1.298 -0.482 -1.149 -0.541 -0.322 -0.29 
 (0.438) (0.029) (0.840) (0.911) (0.813) (1.051) (1.182) (1.011)          
         
N 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
Adjusted R Squared 0.103 0.088 0.108 0.109 0.099 0.106 0.283 0.314 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Linear probability in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have participated in the targeted program. All 








Appendix Table 3.3 
The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Linear Probability Model, Louisiana 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) -0.120**   -0.116**   0.001   -0.045   
 (0.060)   (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.060)  
Tuition ($1,000)  -0.024*  -0.027*  -0.01  -0.005 
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100) -0.256**  -0.365***  -0.178  -0.282** 
  (0.103)  (0.136)  (0.150)  (0.122) 
Elementary School   0.011 0.028 0.066 0.048 -0.076 -0.078 
   (0.087) (0.092) (0.084) (0.088) (0.124) (0.105) 
Secondary School   -0.026 0.237 0.013 0.151 -0.14 0.049 
   (0.149) (0.202) (0.136) (0.216) (0.156) (0.164) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours   0.076 0.092 0.02 0.037 0.019 0.022 
   (0.101) (0.109) (0.071) (0.074) (0.065) (0.065) 
Has Library or Library Media Center     0.089 0.114 0.043 0.026 
     (0.157) (0.156) (0.198) (0.193) 
Percentage of Minority Student     0.678*** 0.554*** 0.617*** 0.553*** 
     (0.161) (0.142) (0.155) (0.137) 
Catholic School       0.210** 0.242** 
       (0.105) (0.098) 
Constant 1.703** 0.106*** 1.145* -0.554 -0.354 -0.465 0.336 -0.273 
 (0.848) (0.039) (0.609) (0.696) (0.597) (0.415) (0.896) (0.513)          
         
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Adjusted R Squared 0.112 0.434 0.102 0.45 0.213 0.506 0.235 0.53 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Linear probability in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have participated in the targeted program. All 









Appendix Table 3.4 
The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Probit Model, Full Model 
 Cross Sites  DC 
Participant 
Indiana  Louisiana  
 Participant  Participant Participant 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) 0.009  -0.071  -0.02  -0.032  
 (0.030)  (0.050)   (0.024)  (0.046)  
Tuition ($1,000)  0  -0.020***  -0.023***  -0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100)  -0.128  0.357*   -0.16  -0.315** 
  (0.085)  (0.216)  (0.130)  (0.137) 
Elementary School -0.121* -0.144* -0.213 -0.144 -0.201*** -0.272** -0.091 -0.099 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.147) (0.107) -0.062 (0.111) (0.107) (0.091) 
Secondary School -0.169* -0.086 -0.142 0.092 (0.010) 0.12 -0.151 0.029 
 (0.086) (0.120) (0.155) (0.141) -0.123 (0.134) (0.131) (0.132) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 0.025 0.022 -0.05 0.023 0.268*** 0.372*** -0.023 -0.016 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.046) (0.037) -0.081 (0.094) (0.063) (0.064) 
Has Library or Library Media Center -0.002 0.015 0.166 0.286**  (0.094) -0.013 0.057 0.042 
 (0.118) (0.104) (0.169) (0.129) -0.078 (0.091) (0.159) (0.151) 
Percentage of Minority Student 0.465*** 0.393** -0.024 -0.084 0.097  0.037 0.715*** 0.618*** 
 (0.102) (0.160) (0.137) (0.168) -0.127 (0.120) (0.127) (0.124) 
Catholic School 0.298*** 0.336*** 0.064 -0.186*  0.569*** 0.604*** 0.248*** 0.290*** 
 (0.060) (0.078) (0.089) (0.099) (0.075) (0.057) (0.089) (0.079) 
DC 0.132 0.167       
 (0.200) (0.108)       
LA -0.238 -0.234**       
 (0.286) (0.109)       
         
N 317 317 47 47 111 111 159 159 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: Average marginal effects after Probit regressions in coefficients. The dependent variable takes value 1 if school have 





Chapter 4  
Do You Have Your Cream with Your Choice? Characteristics of Students Who Moved into 
or out of a Private School Choice Program 
 
Introduction 
In the U.S., school choice programs have been considered as remedies for the unsatisfying public 
education system. Supporters of school choice programs state that such programs will help 
improve student educational achievement, especially for those who come from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, by (1) providing access to objectively better schools, and (2) allowing parents to 
choose the school which is most suitable for their child (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955, 
1962). 
Critics, on the other hand, argue such choice programs lure the best students away from 
current public schools and result in a negative “cream skimming effect” on those who remain 
behind (Altonji, Huang, & Taber, 2015). Even when program applicants were admitted in choice 
schools under random draws, more disadvantaged students tend to be “pushed out” of programs 
at a disproportionally higher rate than their more advantaged peers, critics claim (Mincberg, 
2003). If they occur, “cream skimming” and “pushing out” undermine the theory that expanded 
parental school choice will further the goal of educational equity. 
This selection issue also raises concerns when interpreting effects of choice programs. 
Lottery-based school choice programs are the most appealing approach to estimating the true 
effect of a school choice program. Under random assignment, one would expect to obtain 
unbiased program effects by simply comparing the outcomes of treatment and control groups. 





when it is offered or failing to remain in the choice school after initially attending using the 
choice-placement. Such self-selections violate the “random” assumption of field experiments 
(Barnard et al. 2003) thus challenging the internal validity of program evaluation. Though 
conservative approaches such as intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis and econometric techniques like 
Instrument Variable (IV) or Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) models have been adopted 
to account for selection and therefore preserve the internal validity of experiments, the fact that 
program effects on non-compliers are never actually observed does limit external validity (e.g. 
Howell & Peterson 2006; Cowen, 2008).  
Notably, in addition to presenting external validity concerns, a systematic pattern of 
program attrition indicates that the program may not be able to remedy educational failure 
among a targeted student population. It is critical for policy makers to determine the sorts of 
students for whom such an intervention is most promising, and if the intervention as 
implemented indeed covers the targeted groups. Further knowledge about the program non-
compliers would also make policy makers aware of the potential barriers that are preventing 
targeted families from fully participating in the program. 
Considerations of choice programs’ selection issues are particularly important now when 
voucher and other school choice programs are experiencing significant expansions. So far, 
evidence from small-scale privately-funded voucher programs in Charlotte (NC), Cleveland 
(OH), New York City (NY), and publicly-funded voucher programs in Milwaukee (WI), 
Washington (DC) and Ohio provide informative yet inconsistent patterns of program “cream 
skimming” and “pushing out” students based on their demographics (Carlson et al., 2013; 
Campbell et al., 2005; Cowen, 2010; Cowen et al., 2012; Figlio, 2014; Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 





Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006). There is little evidence of consistency in the patterns of students’ 
participation in private school choice programs, demographically and institutionally. 
In addressing these concerns, this study identifies the factors that influence students’ 
participation in the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) in school years 2012-13 to 2014-15, 
which were the first three years of the program. The LSP is one of the first statewide private 
school choice programs that offers publicly funded vouchers to cover private school tuition for 
students from low-income families that previously attended low-performing public schools. 
Initially established in 2008 as a pilot program in New Orleans, the LSP was expanded to a 
statewide program in the 2012-13 school year. LSP placements are based on school-grade level 
lotteries while accounting for student priorities. We specifically examine what factors predict 
LSP participating students’ self-selecting out of the program in the form of students who were 
unable or unwilling to use the voucher even when it was offered and the voucher using students 
who left the attending private school and returned to the public sector. Those factors include 
student demographics, attributes of assigned private schools, residential district educational 
resources, and institutional attributes of the public schools students attended in the baseline year.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the research literature on 
student participation patterns in private school choice programs in the U.S., followed by a 
description of the subject of our study, the LSP. We then present our research methodology, 
including the data and analytical strategy we use in this study. The following section presents the 





Prior Studies on Student Participation in Private School Choice Programs 
Empirical studies have examined student participation in voucher and voucher-type 
scholarship programs that target disadvantaged students in Charlotte (NC), the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Milwaukee (WI), Ohio, and New York City (NY).  
Usage rates of voucher programs vary between programs with different designs as well as 
between participating families with different backgrounds. In the New York City School Choice 
Scholarship Program, which was funded privately by the School Choice Scholarship Foundation 
(SCSF), nearly 26% of students failed to use the vouchers to attend private schools within the 
area during the program’s first year (Howell, 2004). The decline rates are similar in other 
privately funded programs such as the Children’s Scholarship Fund (CSF) in Charlotte, NC, 
where 24% of the voucher lottery winners declined the voucher when it was initially offered 
(Cowen, 2010). In the first federally funded voucher program in DC, one fourth of the lottery 
winners failed to use the voucher in the first year (Wolf et al., 2006). 
Who are those decliners? Evidence from New York (Howell, 2004), DC (Wolf et al. 
2006) and Ohio (Figlio & Karbownik, 2016) suggest that relatively low-achieving students are 
more likely to decline to use the awarded voucher for attending private schools, while Florida 
(Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 2010; Hart, 2014) presents a case where relatively high-performing 
students are less likely to use the voucher-type tax-credits to attend private schools. No 
consistent “cream skimming” has been found across these programs based on student 
achievement. 
Student demographics also play important roles in family decision making regarding 
voucher usage. Males, African Americans, Hispanics, and students with special educational 





2005; Cowen, 2010; Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; Fleming et al., 2013). Family 
socioeconomic status also shows a negative association with voucher declining (Howell, 2004; 
Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; Fleming et al., 2013), as families with a lower household 
income, a lower maternal educational level, and a larger family size tend to be more likely to 
give up the chance to attend a private school. Meanwhile, voucher decliners in the DC 
Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP) and Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) 
tend to have higher residential stability (Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; Fleming et al., 2013). 
Location is also an important consideration for voucher usage, as parents who decline vouchers 
in New York City, Dayton (OH), and Washington (DC) claim the inconvenient locations of 
preferred private schools were a barrier to utilize the voucher (Howell et al., 2006). 
Campbell et al. (2005) find student residential school district attributes appear to have a 
strong influence on school choice, as students from districts with higher proportions of minority 
students, with lower educational expenditure, and with lower private school density tend to be 
more likely to remain in current public schools and not to switch to private schools using 
voucher support. Since all three of these indicators refer to lower educational resources, this 
pattern suggests that students that were unable or unwilling to utilize the voucher in the first 
place tend to be more educationally disadvantaged. 
Another important student participation consideration is students opting out after initially 
using a voucher. Descriptively, there is substantial evidence that students who attend private 
schools using a voucher tend to opt out at a high rate in the later years. In Milwaukee, the 
program drop-out rate has ranged from 22% to 35% every year (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 
2012; Carlson et al., 2013). In New York City, this rate was about 22% annually (Howell, 2004). 





the voucher users stopped using vouchers over each of the first four years (Waddington & 
Berends, 2017). The private school attrition rates in voucher programs are similar as student 
mobility rate in public schools. The National Assessment of Educational Progress reported that 
in 1998 roughly 33% of 4th graders, 20% 8th graders, and 10% of 12th graders had changed 
schools at least once in previous 2 years (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 
2010), and this rate is generally high in large urban districts populated disproportionally by 
minority students. 
Studies of students who opt-out from continuing to attend the private schools of these 
programs present a clearer pattern. Students who struggle in private schools academically leave 
the program at higher rates (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013; Figlio et al., 
2014). Those private school leavers are more likely to be minorities, in higher grade levels 
(Howell, 2004; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013), with lower residential stability 
(Howell, 2004), and lower family income (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al. 2012; Howell, 2004). 
These characteristics which predict voucher attrition also describe students with educationally 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Those students were originally targeted by those programs in the 
first place. Cowen et al. (2012) further find that students who previously attended private schools 
with a larger share of minority students or voucher students have a higher likelihood of returning 
to the public education system. 
In sum, students who come from disadvantaged families and in higher grade levels are 
more likely to decline the voucher for private schooling in the first place. Even after accepting 
the voucher, those students are more likely to transfer back to public schools. No consistent 
evidence on school cream skimming based on test scores has been found, however, low-





know if these patterns of voucher declining and voucher program attrition are because more 
disadvantaged students are prevented from attending private schools, “counseled out” of them 
once they are there, or voluntary leave the program. It is at least possible that some families, both 
disadvantaged and advantaged, have a higher preference for public schooling even when the 
opportunity for private schooling is offered to them or after personally experiencing private 
schooling for themselves. 
Background: the Case of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
Currently, eighteen states have adopted at least one voucher program, and the Louisiana 
Scholarship Program (LSP) is one of the first statewide private school choice program that offers 
publicly funded vouchers to cover the private school tuition for students from low-income 
families that previously attended low-performing public schools. Initially established in 2008 as 
a pilot program in New Orleans, the LSP was expanded to a statewide program during the 2012-
13 school year. Students with a family income of less than 250% of the federal poverty line that 
previously attended public schools that were graded as C, D, or F15 (or incoming 
kindergarteners) are eligible for LSP vouchers. In the first year of program expansion (the 2012-
13 school year), 41% of the K-12 student population was eligible for this voucher, 9,809 eligible 
students applied for the scholarship, and 5,771 of them (0.82% of the K-12 student population) 
received a voucher worth on average $5,242. Compare to all students in Louisiana, the applicants 
were disproportionally African Americans (87% versus 12%16 ).  The voucher amount was set as 
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 School Grades in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline year (2011-12). 
16
 SOURCE: The Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2) is a special tabulation prepared 
by the U.S. Census Bureau's Population Division and sponsored by the National Center for 






90% of the combined state and local foundation aid to the student or the tuition amount charged 
by the chosen private school, whichever was less.  
Several features differentiate the LSP from other voucher programs. First private schools 
must accept the LSP voucher amount as the full cost of educating the child and cannot require 
that parents “top-up” the voucher value. Further, eligible students are assigned the voucher for 
school-grade sets under a lottery mechanism accounting for their lottery priorities. Specifically, 
students with disabilities and “multiple birth siblings” are automatically awarded a scholarship if 
there was available space at their preferred school. Under such a mechanism, private schools 
cannot apply admission standards to voucher students based on their family socio-economic 
status or achievement level. These factors may make it less likely that the school could 
selectively enroll students based on student backgrounds. 
Second, applicants to the LSP could list up to five private schools on a tiered preference 
in their application. They were placed in a preferred school under random draws at the school-
grade level while considering their lottery priorities. This design could increase parents’ 
probability of taking up the voucher because its award coincides with placement in a school 
requested by the parents, often their first-or second-choice school (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & 
Roth, 2005; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). 
Third, students in Louisiana are not limited to only traditional public-school options. 
There is also a very active charter school sector, especially in school districts like New Orleans 
(Wolf & Lasserre-Cortez, 2018). Various public school choice programs, including magnet 
schools and charter schools, pre-dated the LSP and enrolled 30% of LSP applicants. Since 
parents in Louisiana have more alternate schooling options, they face lower costs of moving out 





compared to other voucher programs, especially in the districts with a higher density of charter 
and magnet schools. 
Lastly, studies reveal that the private schools participating in the LSP tend to be below 
average in school quality. Only one-third of the private schools in Louisiana receive LSP 
voucher using students, and those schools tend to have lower tuition costs and smaller 
enrollments than the average Louisiana private school, both of which are indicators of lower 
quality schools (Chapter 3). Further, Mills and Wolf (2017) show that voucher awarded students 
fell significantly behind their peers academically in public schools during the first two years of 
the program, however this difference became statistically null by the third year. This pattern 
suggests the private schools participating in the LSP failed to improve student academic 
achievement, especially for the first two years. Thus, we expect many LSP students to have made 
a strategic move to opt out from the program before the third year, especially those from 
relatively more advantaged families who are more motivated and able to obtain a quality 
education for their children. 
This study aims to further the literature about student participation in voucher programs 
by analyzing student participation patterns during the first three years of the LSP: who they are, 
where they go, and why. Specifically, we test if there is a systematic initial cream skimming or 
later opting out of students based on their individual demographics, family backgrounds, and 
academic achievements.  
Data and Sample Descriptive 
The data we analyze come from the LSP eligible applicant, Student Information System 
(SIS), and State Assessment files. These student-level restricted use files were provided by the 






The major outcome of interest of our study is student voucher usage status in the 
Louisiana Scholarship Program. We obtain this information from the LSP eligible applicant file. 
Voucher usage status is recorded in the unit of fiscal quarters17 and a student is recorded as “1” 
in quarter Q for usage if she or he has used the voucher to attend a private school in Louisiana 
during the time period Q. The LSP eligible applicant file also provides information on student 
individual demographics (e.g. gender, ethnicity, grade level, and multiple-birth siblings), eligible 
applicant’s school choice sets, and lottery placement at the baseline year. Since parents were not 
required to report their household income and educational levels for application, we obtain the 
Neighborhood Average Household Income18 associated with the applicant’s residential zip-code 
to proxy for family socio-economic status (SES).  
Another major consideration is student movement among schools in the education system 
of Louisiana. We obtain this information from the Student Information System (SIS) files for 
fiscal year 2011-12 (baseline year) through 2014-15 (year three). These data provide student 
enrollment records prior to and after participating in the LSP. In using these data, we are able to 
identify if and when a voucher user has returned to a public school during July 2011 through 
June 2015.  
Moreover, we merge our dataset with students’ State Assessment records on math 
achievement from the school year 2011-12 (baseline year) through 2014-15 to track student 
annual achievement. Students in Louisiana who are not classified as having a special need are 
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 For instance, in school year 2012-2013, Quarter 1 denotes the time period of July, August, and 
September 2012, Quarter 2 denotes the time period of October, November, and December 2012, 
Quarter 3 denotes the time period of January, February, and March 2013, and Quarter 2 denotes 
the time period of April, May, and Jun 2013. 
18





required to take state assessments in grades three through eight. The exams given are criterion-
referenced tests that align with Louisiana’s state standards. The raw test scores are in scale scores 
between 100 and 500 with a mean of 300 and a standard deviation of 50. To better compare 
students’ test scores over time and grade levels, we convert these scale scores into standardized z 
scores based on grade level. By including baseline or current student test scores, we restrict our 
analytical sample to only elementary students in grade three through eight in 2012-13 with test 
scores. 
In addition to the data sets provided by the LDE, we also collect information on the 
private schools19 that receive voucher students during school year 2012-13 through 2014-15. The 
private school characteristics include student ethnicity composition, school tuition cost, and the 
number of voucher students enrolled in the first year after statewide program expansion. We also 
estimate the distance between the assigned private school and the student’s home by estimating 
the general distance between school and home zip codes20 to proxy for the convenience of 
attending the lottery-assigned private school.  
Since the major aim of this chapter is to identify the selection issues of the LSP at the 
post-lottery period, those students who were not issued vouchers are excluded from our analysis. 
Our analytic sample only includes the program applicants who were awarded the scholarship in 
the first year, 2012-13. Furthermore, we assume that parental choices for kindergarteners, who 
may be entering school for the first time, are different from those for students in higher grades. 
Most of the rising kindergarten students lack information about their previous public school 
                                                 
19 Data were collected from the Private School Universe Survey (PSS) (2011-12 and 2013-14). 
20 Zip code distances were obtained from the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) Distance 





attended, since there was none. Therefore, we exclude the 1,333 kindergarten awardees from our 
sample, resulting in an analytic sample of 4,426 students. 
Sample Description 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of students ‘demographics and characteristics 
of the public school they previously attended. A majority of non-kindergarten voucher awardees 
are African American students (88%), in elementary grades (82%), and come from Traditional 
Public School (TPS) (74%). Only 6% of the voucher awarded students are classified as having a 
special educational need, 4% of the students have multi-birth siblings, and 38% of them have 
previously attended the LSP Pilot program. Overall, more than 90% of scholarships are awarded 
to students’ first preference schools.  
 
Table 4.1 
Individual and Baseline School Characteristics of Voucher Awarded Students (2012) 
  Overall Sample  Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
Variable Count %   Count % 
Student Characteristics  (N=4,426)   (N=1,382) 
Female 2,244 50.7  674 48.8 
African American 3,893 88.0  1,228 88.9 
Hispanic 109 2.5  29 2.1 
Caucasian and Other Races 424 9.6  125 9.0 
Special Education Need 270 6.1  102 7.4 
Elementary (grade 1-6) 3,616 81.7  1,382 100.0 
Middle School (grade 7-9) 668 15.1  0 0.0 
High School (grade 10-12) 145 3.2  0 0.0 
Multiple Birth Siblings 175 4.0  41 3.0 
NOLA Participant 1,673 37.8  503 36.4 
Awarded Voucher to 1st Choice School 4,045 91.4  1,262 91.3 
Previously Attended School a (N=2,781)   (N=885) 
Charter School 544 19.6  184 20.8 
Magnet School 175 6.3  40 4.5 
TPS School 2,064 74.1   661 74.7 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who were awarded LSP voucher in the year 
2012-13, with and without restricting to students in Grade 3 through 5 in 2012. 
a: SOURCE: IES-NCES national center for education statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD) 







Table 4.2 presents numerical descriptive statistics of student characteristics including 
students’ baseline achievement, family background, attributes of their lottery-assigned private 
schools, and the community educational resource of their residential school district. Only 1,953 
students have baseline test scores, with an average z-score of -0.54, indicating relatively low-
achieving students in our sample compared to the state population. Students’ family background 
information provided by the Scholarship Application Files merely includes family residential 
address. We connect students’ associated zip codes with the Neighborhood Mean Household 
Incomes provided by the IRS to proxy for their family socio-economic status. On average, non-
kindergarten LSP awardees’ neighborhood household income in 2012 was around $46,600.  
Since not all voucher-using students in our sample have test scores and associated 
schooling information, we categorize our sample into two groups by restricting it to students in 
Grade 3 through 5 during the 2011-2012 baseline year or not. Students in Grade 3 through 5 in 
the baseline year do not pass the 8th grade during the three academic years following the baseline 
year, thus we have full information regarding their educational backgrounds including baseline 
test scores, current school year test scores, and the associated schooling information. Also, by 
restricting the analytical sample to only students in Grade 3 through 5 in the baseline year, we 
are able to essentially eliminate the transition to high school as a possible explanation for moving 
to the public sector (Cowen et al., 2012). As a result, the overall sample comprises 4,426 
voucher-using students, and the restricted sample includes 1,382 students. Descriptive statistics 
of the average student characteristics in these two analytical samples are similar in most aspects. 
The only exception is that we have only elementary students in the restricted sample. The 
restricted sample is demographically representative of the overall sample for further analysis, 






Family Background, Community Educational Resources, and Awarded Private School 
Characteristics of Voucher Awarded Students (2012) 
  
Overall Sample 
   
Students in Grade 3 
through 5 
  Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Student Achievement at the Base Line        
Math Achievement 1,953 -0.54 0.94  1,323 -0.54 0.92 
Family Background        
Neighborhood Mean Household Income ($1,000) a 4,421 46.63 22.84  1,380 47.02 22.68 
Awarded Private School        
Count of Voucher Students 3,618 130.13 99.35  1,150 128.91 92.92 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) b 3,601 73.81 33.04  1,150 73.68 33.26 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 3,601 5.41 1.67  1,150 5.21 1.59 
Distance to Home (mile) 3,585 5.19 5.97   1,144 5.21 6.15 
Community Educational Resources c        
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000) 2,314 12.61 3.82  751 12.70 4.02 
Count of Charter School 2,353 2.67 3.24  767 2.30 2.95 
District Minority Enrollment (%) 2,340 73.19 20.73  754 72.36 20.50 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who were awarded LSP voucher in the year 
2012-13, with and without restricting to students in Grade 3 through 5 in 2012. 
a: SOURCE: IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Master File System, July 2014. 
b: SOURCE: PSS Private School Universe Survey data 2012-13 and 2013-2014 school year. 
c: SOURCE: Data Source: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education 
Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD) "Local Education Agency (School District) Universe 






Differences between Voucher Users and Decliners 
 A decliner refers to a student who has never used the awarded voucher for attending a 
lottery-placed private school during the first three years of the LSP. Table 4.3 compares student 
characteristics between voucher users and decliners. Results from two-tailed t-tests indicate that, 
over all, there are statistically higher proportions of decliners who are males, African Americans, 
with special educational needs, in higher grade levels, who did not participate in the Pilot 
program, and who did not get their first preference school. The significant demographic 
differences between voucher users and decliners regarding gender, ethnicity and grade level 
become null in the restricted sample.  
There are also significant differences between voucher decliners and users in terms of 
assigned private school attributes, educational resources in residential school districts, and the 
institutional characteristics of schools the student previously attended, and these differences in 
the restricted sample are similar to those in the full LSP sample. However, average student 
baseline test scores and family SES between voucher users and decliners are not significantly 
different from each other, for both the restricted sample and the unrestricted sample. These 
descriptive statistics suggest that there is some potential evidence of “cream skimming” in the 
LSP in terms of individual demographics and educational backgrounds, however there may not 



























Student Characteristics          
Female 0.51 0.46 0.05 **  0.49 0.44 0.05  
African American 0.87 0.91 -0.04 **  0.89 0.91 -0.02  
Hispanic 0.03 0.01 0.02 **  0.02 0.00 0.02 ** 
Caucasian and Other Races 0.10 0.08 0.02   0.09 0.09 0.00 
Special Education Need 0.05 0.11 -0.05 ***  0.06 0.14 -0.07 *** 
Grade Level 3.96 4.50 -0.54 ***  4.96 5.03 -0.07 
Multiple Birth Siblings 0.04 0.04 0.00   0.03 0.05 -0.02 
Neighborhood Mean Household 
Income($1,000) 46.72 45.99 0.73  
 
47.04 46.94 0.10 
NOLA Participant 0.41 0.15 0.26 ***  0.39 0.17 0.22 *** 
Math Baseline Achievement -0.53 -0.61 0.08   -0.53 -0.61 0.07 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 0.93 0.81 0.12 ***  0.92 0.85 0.07 *** 
Private School Awarded          
Count of Voucher Students 132.55 113.49 19.06 ***  130.48 119.08 11.40 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 73.48 76.11 -2.63   72.79 79.25 -6.45 ** 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 5.47 4.99 0.47 ***  5.28 4.77 0.51 *** 
Distance to Home (mile) 4.89 7.28 -2.39 ***  4.88 7.33 -2.45 *** 
Community Educational Resources          
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000) 12.46 13.31 -0.85 ***  12.60 13.18 -0.58 
Count of Charter School 2.61 2.98 -0.38 **  2.15 2.99 -0.84 *** 
District Minority Enrollment (%) 72.57 76.11 -3.54 ***  71.78 74.99 -3.21 * 
Previously Attended School          
Carter School 0.19 0.24 -0.05 **  0.21 0.21 0.00 
Magnet School 0.07 0.05 0.01   0.05 0.01 0.04 ** 
TPS School 0.75 0.71 0.04 *  0.74 0.78 -0.04  
* p<0.1, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, two tail t-test.  
Notes: Analysis sample includes non-kindergarten students who were awarded the voucher, with 
and without restricting students to only in Grade 3 through 5 in 2012. Users refer to students who 
have ever used the voucher to attend a private school during school year 2012-13 to 2014-15, 
and Decliners refer to students who have never used the voucher placement during school year 






Characteristics Differences between LSP Leavers and Stayers 
Student school movement after attending the private school is another major outcome of 
interest in our study. We use the leavers to refer to voucher users who left private schools after 
initially attending one at any time during the program. The leavers comprise two groups of 
students: those who went back to the public-school system and are recorded as enrolled in one 
public school in the SIS as public school returnees, and those who switched to another private 
school without using a voucher or left Louisiana and thus are untraceable in the SIS. In our 
study, we focus both on the general leavers as well as the specific public school returnees.  
Simple mean comparison of characteristics between students who have ever left the LSP 
private schools and those who always remain are provided in Table 4.4. Among the non-
kindergarten voucher users, overall, the subgroup that left the LSP private school anytime during 
the school years 2012-2013 through 2014-2015 contained significantly higher proportions of 
students who are African American, with special educational needs, in lower grade levels, did 
not participate in the Pilot program, and were awarded their first preference school. The 
significant differences on ethnicity composition between stayers and leavers become null for the 
restricted sample, while other differences remain. Further, voucher users who left LSP private 
schools on average had lower math achievement scores at both the baseline year (Testt0) and the 
year of switch (Testt), for both the full sample and the restricted sample. These results provide 
some evidence that the LSP participating schools may have “pushed out” students with 
disadvantages or the students most struggling in their new private schools tended to leave them 
voluntarily.  
Meanwhile, students attending private schools with smaller voucher enrollments, lower 





residential school districts tend to be more likely to leave their LSP private school, for both the 
full LSP sample and the restricted sample. This trend indicates characteristics of students’ 
educational institutions also play a role in students’ decisions regarding switching out of this 
school voucher program.  
 
Table 4.4 




















Student Characteristics          
Female 0.50 0.50 0.00  0.49 0.47 0.02 
African American 0.86 0.88 -0.02 **  0.88 0.89 -0.01 
Hispanic 0.03 0.02 0.00  0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Caucasian and Other Races 0.11 0.09 0.01 **  0.10 0.08 0.01 
Special Education Need 0.07 0.06 0.01 *  0.10 0.07 0.03 ** 
Baseline Grade Level 8.82 8.33 0.49 **  4.90 5.10 -0.20 *** 
Multiple Birth Siblings 0.03 0.03 0.00  0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income($1,000) 45.38 45.89 -0.51  45.26 46.52 -1.26 
NOLA Participant 0.14 0.26 -0.12 ***  0.16 0.32 -0.16 *** 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 0.40 0.89 -0.49 ***  0.33 0.87 -0.54 *** 
Achievement        
Test t0 -0.50 -0.57 0.07 **  -0.47 -0.56 0.09 ** 
Test t -0.57 -0.65 0.08 ***  -0.65 -0.72 0.06 ** 
Test t- Test t-1 -0.01 0.03 -0.03  0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Private School Awarded          
Count of Voucher Students 137.08 127.57 9.51 ***  137.60 126.92 10.68 * 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 73.21 73.68 -0.47  71.33 73.72 -2.39 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 5.63 5.28 0.36 ***  5.58 5.12 0.46 *** 
Distance to Home (mile) 4.31 5.28 -0.97 ***  4.09 5.28 -1.18 *** 
Community Educational Resources          
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000) 12.51 12.61 -0.10  12.52 12.84 -0.32 * 
Count of Charter School 3.13 2.78 0.35 ***  3.29 2.38 0.90 *** 
District Minority Enrollment (%) 74.10 73.54 0.56  73.93 73.55 0.39 
Previously Attended School          
Carter School 0.17 0.18 -0.01  0.18 0.19 -0.02 
Magnet School 0.06 0.07 -0.01  0.04 0.05 -0.02 
TPS School 0.77 0.75 0.02  0.79 0.75 0.04 
* p<0.1, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, two tail t-test.  
Notes: Cells indicate percentage of original 2012-13 voucher students of each demographic 
category in each switching category. Leaver refer to students who have ever return to public 
schools after initially used the voucher placement during school year 2012-13 to 2014-15, and 
Stayer refer to students who have never switch to public schools during school year 2012-13 to 






This study focuses on student participation during the first three years in the LSP: How 
do student backgrounds predict voucher decliners and users? What characteristics are associated 
with voucher attrition? Addressing these two research questions, our study first compares the 
characteristics of families and students who declined vouchers when offered to those who 
accepted, and then we compare the characteristics of families and voucher students who switch 
to public schools to those who remain. Since our study focuses on (first cohort) students’ post-
lottery behaviors, this study is purely observational in design, though the LSP is based on lottery 
assignments.  
Voucher Usage 
For the first research question, we are interested in students who were unable or 
unwilling to use the voucher when offered, the decliners. Table 4.5 summarizes LSP voucher 
usage status during the 2012-13 to 2014-15 school years. The overall take-up rate for the first 
cohort non-kindergarten voucher-awarded students is 87.5%, indicating only one-eighth of 
students had never used a voucher-supported placement during the first three years of the LSP. 
This take-up rate is higher than other lottery-based voucher programs nationwide. The fact that 
students were simultaneously offered a voucher and placement in a specific preferred private 
school likely contributed to this high take-up rate (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005; 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). The voucher take-up rate for the restricted sample is 86.6%, which 











Students in Grade 3 through 5 
(N=1,382) 
 Count %  Count % 
Ever Used LSP 3,865 87.3 
 
1,196 86.5 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who were awarded LSP voucher at the year 
2012-13, with and without restricting to students in grade 3 through 5 at the baseline year. 
 
To further account for covariates among student characteristics and educational 
backgrounds that influence the decliner decision, we use a Probit regression to estimate the 
effect of student background on parent behavior (𝑦1) of declining (1) or taking (0) the voucher 










′. 𝜷 + 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜸 + 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜹 + 𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜽 + 𝑖𝑐  
 (2) 
Where student i’s likelihood of declining the voucher (𝑌1
∗) is a function of his/her 
individual characteristics (𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖), characteristics of the private schools students were placed 
to (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖), residential school district educational resources (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖), institutional 
characteristics of previously attended public schools (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖), and random error . To 
account for spatial auto-correlation due to students placed in the same private school having the 
same private school characteristics and similar community educational resources, robust standard 







Since student sector switching occurs across all three school years, student movement 
decisions are best captured by a longitudinal decision-making model. More importantly, once a 
student leaves the private school of choice, she or he will not be exposed to the risk of re-exiting 
the program at a later time. As a result, survival models are especially appropriate to estimate 
what kind of and to what extend the students’ backgrounds influence their decisions regarding 
switching back to public schools during the school year 2012-13 through 2014-15. 
We first estimate the unconditional hazard of switching sectors. Assuming the student 
who is using a voucher to attend a private school is exposed to the risk of switching back to a 
public school at a rate of: 
h(𝑡𝑖𝑗) = Pr(T𝑖 = j|T𝑖 ≥ j)     (3) 
where h(t) is the hazard rate of a voucher-using student moving back to the public sector at the 
time j conditional on remaining in the private school before time j. Once the student makes a 
movement in year j, the student will no longer be considered to be at risk. On average, the hazard 
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Where 𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗 refers to the number of students who moved back to public schools during year 
j and 𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗 represents the number of students remaining in private schools at the beginning 
of year j (Singer & Willett, 2003, p.332).  
 We first estimate the unconditional hazard of voucher usage in fiscal quarters during 
school years 2012-13 to 2014-2015 and graph the probability of staying in the voucher private 
schools as a Kaplan-Meier survival function in Figure 4.1. The figure clearly shows that the 





in our study, with the biggest drops during summer sessions, which is between Quarter 4 of prior 
fiscal year (April through June) and Quarter 1 of the current fiscal year (July through 
September). We further code student LSP annual voucher usage as the fall semester usage in 
Quarter 2 (October through December) of each school year. Any student who is noted as 
“voucher user” in the Quarter 2 of year t while noted as “not using” in Quarter 2 of year t+1 is 
recognized as a leaver in year t. 
 
Figure 4.1 Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities, school year 2012-13 through 2014-15, in fiscal 
year quarters 
 
The hazard rate of annual-leaving among the original voucher users is presented in Table 
4.6, including the count of students remaining in private schools at the beginning of each school 
year in Column 1 (𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗), and the count of students who left the program during each school 





























obtained from Equation 4, and the cumulative Survivor Function (Column 4) is the proportion of 
students who remain in private schools accounting for the overall voucher users. Hazard rates of 
voucher using students leaving the program are estimated for the overall sample and for the 
restricted sample, separately. We further counted leavers by school movement type in Column 5 
and 6. As student enrollment data are not available for the end of school year 2014-15, the count 
of sector-switching students for school year 2014-15 is not available. 
 
Table 4.6 

















Moved to Other Private 
Schools without Using 
Voucher or Left 
Louisiana Entirely 
(6) Time 
Overall Sample (N=3,865)       
School Year 2012-13 3,861 1003 0.260 0.740 799 133 
School Year 2013-14 2,858 572 0.200 0.592 429 153 
School Year 2014-15 2,286 617 0.270 0.432 N/A N/A 
Students in Grade 3 through 
 5 (2012) (N= 1,197)   
  
School Year 2012-13 1,196 318 0.266 0.734 272 46 
School Year 2013-14 878 166 0.189 0.595 136 30 
School Year 2014-15 712 256 0.360 0.381 N/A N/A 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who have ever used LSP voucher during the 
2012-13 to 2014-15 school year, with and without restricting to students in grade 3 through 5 at 
the baseline school year 2012-13. Usage status are obtained from the applicant file and the 
school movement status are obtained from SIS 2012-13 through 2014-15. 
 
 
There are three important patterns of LSP participants’ post-lottery movements. First, a 
majority of students have changed schools during the years observed. By the end of the third 
year, 43% of students who have ever used vouchers remained in their lottery-placed private 
school, resulting in an overall attrition rate at about 19% of the original sample annually, 
accounting for 57% over three years. This voucher leaver rate is lower than the MPCP’s 22% to 
35% every year (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013) and the New York City 





to Louisiana public schools than to leave the state public school system entirely, at least in the 
first two years. Among voucher users, nearly 74% of them continued attending the private school 
of choice through the first year, and about 80% of voucher leavers, accounting for 799 students, 
switched back to public schools by the end of school year 2012-13 (column 5). Of students who 
remained in private schools at the beginning of the second year, 20% switched back to the public 
sector by the end of the second year, while 75% of leavers switched to public schools in 
Louisiana. Lastly, the hazard and survival trends between the full sample and restricted sample 
are nearly identical. This result indicates the restricted sample has the same attrition patterns as 
the full sample and is representative of the overall sample in terms of program attrition rate, even 
though it is restricted to students who started in the elementary grades of 3 through 5.  
We first use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model to predict LSP leavers by school year: 
ℎ̂(𝑡𝑗) = exp (𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜷 + 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜸 + 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜹 + 𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜽)(4) 
Where voucher using student i’s hazard rate of leaving the LSP private school at year j is 
estimated as a function of his or her individual characteristics (𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖), characteristics of the 
private school the student was placed in (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖), residential school district educational 
resources (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖), and institutional characteristics of their previously attended public 
school (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖). These measures are the same as in Equation 2. To account for spatial 
auto-correlation due to students placed in the same private school having the same private school 






Since there is more than one event that is considered a “failure” of remaining in private 
schools, we further estimate the effect of student background on the hazard rates of switching to 
a public school using Competing Risk Regressions as compare to leave the Louisiana public 
school system entirely, which posit a model for the sub-hazard function of a failure event of 
primary interest and accounts for covariates of predictive factors. This model is also employed in 
Cowen et al. (2012) for estimating student participation patterns in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP). As student school enrollment status for the end of school year 2014-15 
is not available, this analysis is restricted to LSP leavers in school years 2012-13 and 2013-14. 
It is important to note that the hazard ratios in both Cox Proportional Hazard Models and 
Competing-risk Regressions hazard ratios 𝛽𝑖 are not interpreted in the same manner as 
coefficients in multiple linear regressions. Since the model is in exponential form, a variable with 
a hazard ratio larger than 1 should be interpreted as having a higher probability of experiencing 
the hazard of leaving the private school, while a variable with a hazard ratio smaller than 1 
should be interpreted as having a lower probability of experiencing that hazard. 
Results 
In this section, we present the estimated results on the characteristics that differentiate the 
voucher decliners from their voucher-using counterparts (Table 4.7), on characteristics 
differentiating the voucher using students who left LSP private schools from the ones who 
remained in private schools (Table 4.8 and Table 4.9), during the first three years of the 
expansion of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (school years 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15). 
Results are presented using the full sample and the restricted sample, separately. Moreover, we 





scores and associated educational backgrounds, separately. Model 3 in Table 4.7 and Model 3 
through 5 in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 are our preferred models for interpretation. 
Who declines? 
Table 4.7 presents the estimated marginal effects of the student individual characteristics 
and educational backgrounds on the students’ decision to decline the voucher when it was 
offered. Our primary results of Model 3, which focuses only on students in Grade 3 through 5 at 
the baseline year, indicate that there is little evidence that LSP participating private schools have 
“cream skimmed” more advantaged students. Different from the simple mean comparisons, 
results of the Probit model reveal no significant differences between voucher decliners and users 
in terms of student gender, ethnicity, family background, and baseline test scores. Students with 
a special educational need tend to have a higher likelihood of declining the voucher when it was 
offered (p<.10). These results are consistent across all model specifications. 
Students who are more committed to the program tend to have a lower tendency of 
declining the voucher. In Model 1 and 2 without controlling for student educational 
backgrounds, students who had participated in the New Orleans Pilot Program are predicted to 
be about 12% less likely to decline a voucher when offered. This effect fades out after 
controlling for student educational backgrounds. Meanwhile, students who were assigned to their 
first-choice schools tend to have a lower likelihood of declining the assigned private school, 









Predicting Voucher Decliners 
 Overall Sample  Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
VARIABLE Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Student Characteristics            
Female -0.014 (0.013)  -0.013 (0.019)  -0.036 
 
(0.031) 
African American 0.026 (0.025)  -0.008 (0.034)  0.011 
 
(0.047) 
Hispanic -0.080 (0.056)     
  
Special Education Need 0.043 ** (0.021)  0.058 * (0.032)  0.083 * (0.046) 
Baseline Grade Level 0.004 (0.003)  -0.011 (0.013)  -0.010 
 
(0.019) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.011 (0.036)  0.106 (0.077)  0.069 
 
(0.096) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income ($1,000) 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.001 
 
(0.001) 
NOLA Participant -0.124 *** (0.030)  -0.129 *** (0.039)  -0.059 
 
(0.152) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School -0.101 *** (0.020)  -0.065 ** (0.035)  -0.122 *** (0.044) 
Baseline Achievement Score       0.009 
 
(0.020) 
Awarded Private School       
  
Count of Voucher Students 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 0.001 *** (0.000)  0.001 *** (0.000)  0.001 ** (0.001) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) -0.013 (0.009)  -0.022 *** (0.007)  -0.045 *** (0.012) 
Distance to Home (mile) 0.004 *** (0.001)  0.005 *** (0.001)  0.006 ** (0.002) 
Community Educational Resources         
  
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)         0.011 ** (0.005) 
Count of Charter School         0.020 *** (0.007) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)         -0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Previously Attended Public School         
  
Charter School         0.096 ** (0.051) 
Magnet School         -0.106 ** (0.048) 
            
Observations 3585    1116    581 
  
Significance level * p<0.10, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
Notes: Estimates are average marginal effects after Probit regressions. Dependent variable equals to 1 if a student has ever declined a 
voucher after initially offered. Model 1 presents estimates using full sample, and Model 2, Model 3 are estimations for restricted 







The awarded private school’s attributes tend to play a more important role in voucher 
usage decision making. All else equal, students who were awarded private schools with lower 
tuition rates are more likely to decline the voucher: a $1,000 increase in school tuition is 
associated with a 2-to 5-percentage point reduction in the likelihood of declining a voucher, all 
else equal, significant at p<.01. As school tuition rates are positively correlated with school 
quality, it is expected that families that were awarded voucher placements in higher quality 
private schools are more likely to use them and attend the assigned schools. Another significant 
private school predictor is the distance between the awarded private school and home, as a one-
mile increase in the home-school distance is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of declining the voucher, all else equal, significant at the .05 level. This result 
aligns with previous studies and is predicable based on common sense. Furthermore, students 
who were assigned to private schools with higher proportions of minority students are more 
likely to decline the voucher when awarded, at the .01 level of significance. These preference 
patterns are consistent across all model specifications, for both the restricted and full LSP 
samples. 
Notably, students with better educational alternatives have a higher tendency to decline 
the awarded voucher. Controlling for other factors, students living in school districts with higher 
educational expenditures and with more charter schools are more likely to decline their LSP 
placement, significant at the .01 and .05 level, respectively. 
Lastly, students who have experienced charter schools have a higher tendency to decline 
the voucher, while students who attended magnet schools in 2011-12 have a lower tendency to 
do so. It is predicted that students who were enrolled in charter schools at the baseline year 2011-





their peers from TPSs (p<.10), all else equal, while students who were enrolled in magnet 
schools in 2011-12 are predicted to be 10 percentage points less likely to decline awarded 
vouchers, compared to their peers from TPSs (p<.05). One explanation for this result would be 
that families of children who have attended public charter schools are more comfortable staying 
in a public school while families of children who have attended magnet schools and TPSs are 
more willing to make the jump to an unfamiliar private school environment.  
Overall, student demographics (except special educational needs) and student baseline 
achievement are not predictive of voucher declines. Families who are more committed to the 
LSP due to prior experience in the Pilot program tend to be less likely to decline the voucher. 
Moreover, students who were assigned to private schools with lower tuition costs (lower 
quality), students who have better alternatives, and students who previously attended charter 
schools, are more likely to decline the LSP when offered. Voucher decliners are not likely to be 
more disadvantaged, either educationally or economically, than their voucher user counterparts, 
except regarding having a special education need. These results are less consistent with a 
hypothesis that private schools are “cream skimming” certain students into the program as they 
are with the claim that students are self-selecting to participate in the LSP based on their 
commitment to this program and their educational alternatives. 
Who left LSP private schools? 
As suggested by Howell (2004), students who feel socially alienated and families who 
cannot continue to pay the extra costs of a private school education may opt out from attending 
voucher-participating private schools. These students are more likely to come from 





Simple comparisons of student demographics, family backgrounds, and educational 
backgrounds indicate public school returnees somehow differ significantly from students who 
persist in private school. To further test if schools tend to push certain students out of the 
program, we model the relationship between students, residential school districts, and the 
attending private schools by accounting for the passage of time itself using a Cox Hazards 
Model. We condition the voucher usage every year on the same student, family, and school 
characteristics discussed previously. 
Table 4.8 reports estimates of Equation 4, where each reported coefficient is the 
associated hazard ratio of leaving the LSP private school for each factor. Hazard ratios should be 
interpreted as exponentiated coefficients which is similar to odds ratios in logit regressions: 
coefficients greater than 1 indicate increases in the likelihood of returning to the public sector, 
while coefficients smaller than 1 indicate decreases in the likelihood of returning to the public 
sector. The hazard ratio never shows negative values.  
We first provide the estimated effects of student demographics and the characteristics of 
the private school attended on the hazard of leaving LSP, based on the full sample (Model 1) and 
the restricted sample (Model 2). We then include student educational backgrounds along with 
test scores in three specifications based on the restricted sample: with baseline math test score 
Testt0 only (Model 3), math test score at the year of leaving Testt (Model 4), and with the math 





Predicting Leaving LSP Private Schools, Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Student Characteristics       
 Female 0.883**  0.806*** 0.881 0.856* 0.860* 
 (0.046)  (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) 
African American 1.072  1.01 0.991 0.970 0.998 
 (0.100)  (0.122) (0.131) (0.143) (0.145) 
Hispanic 0.863  1.335 1.465 1.379 1.403 
 (0.167)  (0.313) (0.376) (0.390) (0.391) 
Special Education Need 1.172*  1.129 1.028 1.149 1.225 
 (0.111)  (0.175) (0.177) (0.199) (0.206) 
Baseline Grade Level 1.110***  1.293*** 1.180*** 1.186*** 1.177*** 
 (0.016)  (0.059) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.896  1.132 1.29 1.311 1.328 
 (0.149)  (0.156) (0.298) (0.337) (0.330) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income 
($1,000) 0.999  1.002 0.996 0.995 0.995 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
NOLA  0.668***  0.732*** 0.539 0.642 0.630 
 (0.070)  (0.074) (0.320) (0.394) (0.390) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 1.095  1.234 1.790*** 1.786*** 1.717*** 
 (0.111)  (0.192) (0.361) (0.359) (0.348) 
Achievement       
Test t0    0.910**   
    (0.036)   
Test t     0.975  
     (0.027)  
Test t -Test t-1      1.005 







Table 4.8 (continued) 
Significance level *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
Notes: Cox Proportional Hazard Models are performed, stating failure as 1 if a student left the 
LSP private school at year t. Model 1 presents estimates using full sample, Model 2 through 
Model 5 are estimations for the restricted sample. Estimates are hazard ratios. Robust standard 




 Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Awarded Private School       
Count of Voucher Students 0.999  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 1.005***  1.005*** 1.006*** 1.006** 1.006** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 0.921*  0.911* 0.905 0.910 0.918 
 (0.043)  (0.046) (0.059) (0.068) (0.068) 
Distance to Home (mile) 1.010**  1.021*** 1.021*** 1.020** 1.021** 
 (0.005)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Community Educational Resources       
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)    1.031** 1.030** 1.027* 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Count of Charter School    1.004 1.004 1.005 
    (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)    0.994 0.995 0.994 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Previously Attended School       
Charter School    1.307 1.179 1.189 
    (0.291) (0.269) (0.276) 
Magnet School    0.877 0.874 0.882 
    (0.141) (0.150) (0.148) 
       
Observations 7,175  2,212 1,080 1048 1045 




Several important trends are found. First, student test scores show a relatively clearer role 
in deciding to leave the private school a student is attending through the LSP. The relationship 
between lower baseline test scores and a higher probability of leaving the LSP private school 
remains after accounting for student demographics and educational backgrounds. This finding 
aligns with previous studies (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013; Figlio et al., 
2014). The effect of student achievement score and gain score right before leaving the LSP are 
not significantly different from zero after controlling for student demographics and baseline 
achievement. That is, there is little evidence that the LSP is pushing out students with lower 
academic performance while in their chosen private schools. 
Second, only a couple student demographics show consistent effects on the hazard of 
leaving the LSP private school. Male and higher-grade voucher-using students tend to be more 
likely to leave the LSP private schools, significant at the .10 and .01 level, respectively, for both 
the full LSP sample and the restricted sample. Students with a special educational need tend to 
leave the private school at a higher rate, yet this effect is only significant for the overall sample 
(p<.10). This could due to the smaller group of special education students within the restricted 
sample. The effects of gender, special education status, and grade level are consistent with 
previous studies (Rouse, 1998; Carlson et al., 2013; Howell, 2004).  
Also, students with higher commitment to the program tend to face a lower risk of 
returning to public schools. The hazard ratio for previously participated in the New Orleans Pilot 
Program is smaller than 1 across all model specifications, and is statistically significant when 
only accounting for student backgrounds and the characteristics of assigned private schools, 
indicating those students tend to have significantly lower tendencies of leaving the attending 







were awarded their first-choice school face a significantly greater risk of leaving the private 
school of choice (p<.01), which is contrary to our hypothesis. 
Characteristics of voucher-assigned private schools show a more consistent and 
significant effect on the hazards of leaving the LSP. When accounting for only student 
demographics, students in private schools with higher tuition costs tend to have a lower 
likelihood of leaving the LSP, significant at the .10 level, for both the full sample and the 
restricted sample, yet this effect fades out after controlling for student test score and other 
educational background factors. The effect of student ethnicity composition and the accessibility 
of attended private schools are not only statistically significant predictors of voucher attrition, 
they are practically significant as well. Students who attended private schools with higher 
proportions of minority students and with longer distances from home are at a greater risk of 
leaving the LSP. These patterns hold across all model specifications. 
Finally, the effects of students’ residential community educational resources and 
institutional characteristics of having previously attended public school are not significantly 
associated with the hazard of leaving the LSP, all else equal, with the only exception that a 
higher residential district’s per-pupil educational expenditure predicts a lower likelihood of 
leaving the LSP.  
In sum, males, students in higher grades, students who did not attend the Pilot program 
face greater risks of exiting the private school they are attending through the LSP. There is no 
consistent evidence that the LSP is pushing out demographically more disadvantaged students. 
Meanwhile, accounting for student demographics, voucher-using students with lower baseline 
achievement, previously in private schools with a higher proportion of minority students and 







districts with a higher educational per-pupil expenditure tend to leave the attending LSP private 
schools in a higher rate, perhaps attracted by the greater resources in the public schools. 
Who went back to public schools? 
The leavers comprise two groups of students: those who went back to the public school 
system because they chose to, and those who left because they were compelled to, for both 
structural reasons (e.g. graduated) and non-structural reasons (e.g. moved out of state). Since 
those two groups of leavers are based on a different logic, we further conduct a robustness check 
of factors predicting LSP students returning to public schools using Competing-risk Regressions, 
where each reported coefficient is the associated hazard ratio of switching to public schools for 
each factor, with the competing possibility of switching to another private school or leaving the 
state. As student public sector enrollment status is not available for the end of the 2014-15 school 
year, we cannot confirm where the LSP leavers ended up in year 3. As a result, this robustness 
check only focusses on the public-school returnees in school year 2012-13 and 2013-14. 
Table 4.9 presents the estimations from Competing-risk Regressions. Similar as in 
predicting LSP leavers, voucher using students with lower baseline achievement test scores tend 
to switch to public schools at higher rates, a result that is statistically significant in Column 4. 
Current math achievement and achievement gain are not predictive for students returning to 
public schools in school year 2012-13 and 2013-14. Student demographics perform similar roles 
as in predicting LSP leavers, as males and higher-grade voucher-using students face higher risks 
of switching to public schools for the full sample (p<.05), yet these effects fade out after 
restricting the sample to only students in Grade 3 through 5 in 2012. Meanwhile, African 
American and Hispanic students tend to face a higher risk of switching to public schools in the 







specifications. Similar as in predicting LSP leavers, students who attended the Pilot program 
tend to have a significantly lower likelihood of switching to public schools (p<.01), significant 
only when controlling for student demographics and characteristics of attending private schools. 
Still, students who were awarded their first-choice school tend to leave it at a higher rate (p<.01). 
 
Table 4.9 
Predicting Switching to Public Schools, Competing Hazard Model 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Student Characteristics       
 Female 0.849***  0.787*** 0.913 0.840* 0.855 
 (0.046)  (0.063) (0.102) (0.089) (0.091) 
African American 1.269*  1.16 1.163 1.225 1.191 
 (0.172)  (0.208) (0.246) (0.269) (0.259) 
Hispanic 1.029  1.55 1.621 1.844* 1.838* 
 (0.250)  (0.525) (0.569) (0.626) (0.608) 
Special Education Need 1.156  1.197 1.024 1.097 1.121 
 (0.151)  (0.255) (0.230) (0.247) (0.257) 
Baseline Grade Level 1.055***  1.051 0.955 0.929 0.934 
 (0.020)  (0.071) (0.085) (0.079) (0.084) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.918  0.671 0.815 0.881 0.855 
 (0.214)  (0.395) (0.545) (0.588) (0.565) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income 
($1,000) 1.000  1.000 0.996 0.994 0.994 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
NOLA  0.592***  0.616*** 0.516 0.626 0.591 
 (0.066)  (0.082) (0.505) (0.638) (0.601) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 1.148  1.768** 2.991*** 3.938*** 3.700*** 
 (0.153)  (0.453) (1.044) (1.482) (1.425) 
Achievement       
Test t0    0.900   
    (0.061)   
Test t     0.992  
     (0.063)  
Test t -Test t-1      1.084 









Table 4.9 (continued) 
Significance level *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
Notes: Competing-risk Hazards Models are performed, stating failure as 1 if a student left the 
LSP private school at year t and state competing as 1 if student is untraceable at the current year. 
Model 1 presents estimates using full sample, Model 2 through Model 5 are estimations for the 
restricted sample. Estimates are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses and are 
clustered at the lottery assigned private school.  
 
 
 Again, characteristics of voucher-assigned private schools show a consistent and 
significant effect on the hazards of returning to public schools, as students in private schools with 
higher proportions of minority students and farther from home are at greater risks of switching to 
public schools. These patterns hold across all model specifications. 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Awarded Private School       
Count of Voucher Students 0.999  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 1.003*  1.005** 1.006*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 0.941  0.940 0.936 0.956 0.954 
 (0.053)  (0.036) (0.054) (0.059) (0.060) 
Distance to Home (mile) 1.010*  1.029*** 1.028*** 1.030*** 1.030*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Community Educational Resources       
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)    1.025 1.018 1.023 
    (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
Count of Charter School    1.021 1.015 1.019 
    (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)    0.989** 0.988** 0.988** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Previously Attended School       
Charter School    1.317 1.169 1.185 
    (0.388) (0.395) (0.403) 
Magnet School    0.763 0.774 0.782 
    (0.299) (0.307) (0.308) 
       
Observations 5,377  1,681 821 796 793 







Notably, the residential community educational resources tend to influence students’ 
decision to return to public schools, as students residing in districts with higher proportions of 
minority students tend to have a lower likelihood of leaving LSP and switching to public schools 
(p<.05). 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study investigates the attrition patterns in the Louisiana Scholarship Program during 
the first three years after the program expanded statewide (school years 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-
15). The LSP is one of the first statewide voucher programs and is based on lottery placement 
while accounting for an applicant’s portfolio of preferred private schools. The data we use in this 
study are based on all LSP non-kindergarten awardees, giving it high external validity at the state 
level. However, it is important to note that student enrollment status at the end of school year 
2014-15 is not available, so our analysis predicting public school returnees is restricted to the 
2012-13 and 2013-14 school years. Further, as we do not have a direct measure of family income 
or family social-economic status, the measure Neighborhood Mean Household Income can only 
offer indirect information about variation in family financial resources, and its effects are not 
consistently predictive for student movement among schools.  
We find a high take-up rate (87.5 %) and a low attrition rate (19% regarding the original 
sample annually) during the first three years among the non-kindergarten students who were 
offered voucher placements. This high take-up and continuation rate indicates a higher parental 
satisfaction for the assigned schools, even though their children experienced smaller test-score 
gains then their peers who lost the placement lotteries during the first two outcome years (Mills 







Little evidence of school “cream skimming” of high-achieving students was found. 
Student baseline test scores are not significantly predictive of voucher usage. Lower achieving 
students at the baseline year tend to leave the attending private schools at a higher rate in later 
years, however this pattern is not significantly predictive for those who switched back to public 
schools. Other measures of student achievement at LSP private schools, including achievement 
scores and gain scores before school switching, are not predictive of LSP attrition. These patterns 
help us clear out concerns of selection bias in interpreting the LSP’s Treatment-On-Treated 
effects on student math test scores in the first three years (Mills and Wolf, 2017). The negative 
effects of the LSP on math scores in the first two years of the program, and the rebounded effect 
at the third year, are less likely to have resulted from student compositional change. The non-
compliers in the treatment group, those who opted out of the LSP by either declining the offered 
voucher or leaving the attended private school later on, are not necessarily lower achieving 
students than the program stayers.  
Little evidence of school “cream skimming” based on student demographics was found. 
Student demographics of gender, ethnicity, and grade level are not predictive of voucher 
declining, however, students with special educational needs tend to have a higher tendency of 
declining a voucher. There is some evidence males and higher-grade students face greater risk of 
opting out from the private school they are attending through the LSP and returning to the public 
sector. Families with higher commitment to the program, as measured by having previously 
attended the New Orleans Pilot Program, show higher tendencies of both using the voucher and 
remaining in private schools. LSP applicants who were awarded the voucher for first-choice 
schools are more likely to use the voucher, however tend to leave the attending private schools 







evidence that the LSP is “cream skimming” or “pushing out” students based on their 
demographics. 
Furthermore, we find that students assigned to private schools with a larger proportion of 
minority students, and with further distances between home and school, tend to be more likely to 
both decline the voucher and leave the LSP and switch to public schools later on. Meanwhile, 
students residing in better educationally funded districts and with more schooling alternatives 
have a higher tendency of both declining the voucher and leaving the LSP after initially attended 
LSP private schools. These results all are consistent with families making rational benefit-cost 
calculations regarding their school choices.  
This study contributes to the existing literature on student participation patterns in 
publicly funded voucher programs. Previous studies on those patterns in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice and the New York City school choice programs show that disadvantaged students were 
more likely both to refuse to use the voucher when offered and to exit voucher programs early 
after initially using one. The students from disadvantaged backgrounds were the targeted group 
for those programs in the first place. Thus, the higher tendency to reject a voucher or quit school 
choice programs for those students indicates they were struggling in their private school. Our 
study reveals, however, this is not the case in the LSP: families who decline the voucher and 
families who exit the program are not necessarily the most disadvantaged groups. There is little 
evidence that private schools participating in the LSP are “cream skimming” advantaged students 
based on their characteristics, with the sole exception of students with special educational needs 







There is also no substantial evidence that private schools participating in the LSP “push 
out” disadvantaged students based on their characteristics and test scores. On the contrary, 
students tend to self-select themselves out from the program when they attended private schools 
with a greater share of lower SES students (indicated by higher minority enrollments), with 
longer distance to home, and with better residential district educational resource. However, since 
those factors also contribute to attrition in private schools regardless of voucher programs, we 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
The three studies within this dissertation describe the participation patterns of states, schools, and 
students in private school choice programs in the U.S. This work fills several distinct gaps in the 
study of private school choice initiatives, especially of voucher programs. In this concluding 
chapter, I recapitulate the key findings from each paper and then state implications for policy 
analysis and public policy. 
Summary of Findings 
 
 The first paper looks at state's participation in private school choice programs in the U.S. 
(Chapter 2). Specifically, we examine which state-level social factors predict policy decisions 
regarding the enactment and expansion of vouchers, text-credit scholarships, and individual tax-
credit/deductions. Based on the private school choice policy adoption and expansion history of 
49 states during the years 2000 through 2015, we find that political factors, educational needs, 
and economic resources all predict private school choice policy adoption and expansion in some 
ways, and they appear to have a dynamic interaction. The partisan control of policy making 
institutions shows a relatively more consistent influence on the adoption of private school choice 
programs than educational need and economic resource factors, as Republican control of a state’s 
Legislature or Governorship positively predicts the adoption of private school choice 
arrangements over all, and tax-credits and individual tax-credit/deductions individually. 
Educational needs and economic resource factors are not consistently predictive of policy 
adoptions. In predicting policy expansions, the educational need and resources factors trump the 
political factors as the increase of Per-pupil Educational Expenditures negatively predicts the 







positively predict the expansion of private school choice initiatives overall and for individual 
tax-credits/deductions specifically. Finally individual tax-credits/deductions show a different 
logic surrounding policy adoption and expansion than other private school choice policies, as 
states that face a lower risk of educational crises tend to experience a larger expansion of 
individual tax-credits/deductions. 
 In Chapter 3, we compare private school participation decisions in the DC Opportunity 
Scholarship (DC OSP), the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program, and the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program (LSP). We find that, overall, voucher programs that enforce a larger regulatory burden 
on participating schools tend to have a lower participation rate from private schools. Private 
schools in DC and Louisiana, two sites with relatively higher regulatory burdens for private 
schools, have a significantly lower likelihood of participating in the DC OSP and LSP than in 
more lightly-regulated Indiana. The lowest private school participation rate is in Louisiana, 
which has the largest regulatory burden. Further, controlling for state and school characteristics, 
higher tuition levels and larger cohort enrollments, conditions normally associated with high-
quality schools, identify schools that are less likely to participate in voucher programs. Voucher 
participating schools average lower GreatSchools parent-review scores than non-participating 
schools, however this trend is not statistically significant possibly due to a lack of variance in the 
measure of the score. In a sentence, private school voucher programs with higher regulations 
tend to have lower participation rates overall, especially from high-quality schools. 
 The third study (Chapter 4) tests if there are systematic patterns of students opting out of 
the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) by declining the voucher at the first stage, or leaving 
the attending private school later on. The LSP is one of the first state-wide publicly-funded 







public schools. A total of 87% of voucher awarded students have ever used the voucher to attend 
private schools of choice, and less than half the voucher users remain in the program by the end 
of the third year (Chapter 4). Students who are more committed to the program because they 
participated in the New Orleans Pilot Program tend to be less likely to decline the voucher when 
offered and tend to be less likely to leave the attending private school in later years. No 
consistent evidence indicates the LSP is “cream skimming” or “pushing out” students based on 
their family social status or test score. However, special needs students tend to have lower 
likelihood of using the voucher, and students who were placed in private schools farther from 
home and schools that serve a larger minority population, as well as students with better 
educational resource in the residential school district, tend to face a greater risk of leaving the 
LSP.  
Discussions and Conclusion 
While these three papers fill gaps with empirical evidence regarding private school 
choice participation, there are several limitations to the generalizability of these findings and the 
implications that follow. Taken together, all three papers are observational in design, at most 
quasi-experimental. They do not support direct causal inferences. Other limitations are addressed 
in individual chapters. In Chapter 2 where my co-author and I estimate the adoption and 
expansion of private school choice programs in the U.S., we apply state and year fixed effect in 
detecting the factors that influence program expansions within states over time. Since only half 
of the states have adopted at least one type of private school choice program, typically with a 
short time period, our predictions of program expansion are based on only two dozen states with 
less than 200 observations in total, which provides little analytic power. In Chapter 3, we only 







2014-15 school year. The school participation patterns of those programs might correlate with 
some external shock during that year, and might change over time. In Chapter 4, student voucher 
program participations are based on fall usage counts, rather than usage across the year. The 
patterns of students switching back to public school are different from overall program leavers in 
some cases, however this estimate is only based on a two-year analysis due to the unavailability 
of enrollment status at the end of the third school year. Further, since we do not have information 
of attrition patterns in Louisiana private schools in general, we cannot confirm if the student 
attrition patterns in the LSP are unique due to the program design or due to the private school 
environment or some combination of both. 
Despite these caveats, the research presented in this dissertation fills gaps in the practical 
evidences regarding what types of states, schools, and students participate in private school 
choice programs in the U.S., and why. Further, it contributes to an improved understanding of 
the heterogeneous context of private school choice programs.  
The first takeaway from this dissertation refers to the political content of private school 
choice programs. At the state level, the adoption of private school choice programs, especially 
tax-credits and individual tax-credits/deductions, are highly impacted by the state’s partisan 
control, as having Republican control of the Governor’s Office or the Legislature positively 
predicts policy adoption. However, the expansion of programs relies more on a state’s lack of 
educational crises rather than political enthusiasm. This conclusion speaks to the ongoing 
scholarly debate regarding whether the arc of policymaking is driven primarily from need, 
politics, or economics, and whether that changes over time. It also will inform the decisions of 
private school choice advocates regarding which states are the best targets for efforts to enact 







The second takeaway refers to the program design of private school choice initiatives, 
specifically, the program design of the LSP. Has the LSP been “successful”? The success of an 
educational policy intervention can be assessed in many different ways: improving student test 
scores for both participants and non-participants, boosting student educational attainment, 
improving racial integration, enhancing student civic values, serving large numbers of targeted 
students, and attracting broader and better providers. The LSP, on one hand, serves more than 
87% of the targeted students who apply, and its attrition rate is lower than other small-scale 
voucher programs in the U.S. at 19% (Chapter 4); students have equal access to private 
schooling, as no “cream skimming” based on student demographics or current achievement was 
found (Chapter 4). This evidence indicates the LSP is successfully in providing private school 
access for the targeted disadvantaged student population in Louisiana. Further, Egalite, Mills & 
Wolf (2016) find that the LSP transfers have successfully reduced racial segregation in the 
former public schools they attended.  
On the other hand, only one third of private schools in Louisiana participate in the LSP. 
Those participating schools tend to have indicators of lower educational quality than their non-
participating counterparts (Chapter 3). Students who transferred to private schools through the 
program suffered a significant learning loss in the first two years of the program compared to 
their peers remaining in public schools (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018; Mills & 
Wolf, 2017), although those losses appear to have been erased by year three. This evidence 
suggests that the LSP attracts more of the lower-end private schooling providers who fail to 







These findings raise important policy questions about voucher program design in the 
accountability era, which is the third takeaway. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the LSP is one 
of the most regulated voucher programs in the U.S. In attempting to control quality and equity 
through regulation, decision-makers may inadvertently limit the number of high-quality choices 
available to disadvantaged students. As these lower-quality schools do not provide satisfying 
services, even many students who were not harmed academically from attending those private 
schools are lured back to public schools, especially if their public schools have relatively more 
educational resources. By imposing higher regulations on the private school choice program, 
policymakers have effectively reduced the availability of private schools to targeted families, 
both in quality and in quantity. The limited private school participation in the LSP means that it 
has failed to accomplish the fundamental purpose of vouchers: to provide broader and multi-
dimensioned educational models for families with the most need.  
Later studies should focus on how participant experiences of schools and students in the 
LSP differ from those in other voucher programs, and how the participation patterns of schools 
and students in voucher programs differ from the patterns in other forms of private school choice 
in the U.S., especially Education Saving Accounts (ESA) and individual tax-credit/deductions. 
The ESA model is the first policy design considered as a universal voucher arrangement and is 
experiencing the largest expansion nationwide. The individual tax-credit/deduction model is 
preferable for middle-to-higher-income populations and therefore operates according to a 
different logic than private school vouchers. The main conclusion of this dissertation is that, in 
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